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Abstract 
 
Certain parts of the international tax system are largely unexplored from a structural perspective. One 
prominent example is the asymmetric tax treaty network, i.e., the network that consists of bilateral tax treaties 
concluded between developed and emerging countries on the basis of the OECD Model Tax Convention on 
Income and on Capital (OECD model). The relative size of this network is substantial. For instance, the 
United States´ asymmetric tax treaty network represents about 53% of its entire tax treaty network. 
 
This Article offers a structural analysis of the asymmetric tax treaty network. It answers two fundamental 
questions.  First, it elaborates a theory for explaining why a representative emerging country is willing to 
conclude tax treaties with developed countries on the basis of the OECD model. Second, this Article extends 
that theory to understand the dynamics of tax treaty interpretation in the emerging world. This extension aims 
to illuminate the incentive structure that the courts of a representative emerging country normally have when 
construing OECD-based tax treaties in the foreign direct investment (FDI) area. Game theory is used as a 
theoretical framework for answering both questions. 
 
1 Associate Professor of Law, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. I have benefited from comments on previous 
drafts of this Article by Reuven Avi-Yonah, Richard Bird, Yariv Brauner, Tsylly Dagan, Gabriel Gotlib, 
Andrew Guzman, Emiliano Marambio Catán, Yoram Margalioth, Tom O´Shea, Diane Ring, Thomas Ulen, 
Phil West, and participants in workshops at the University of Toronto, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, 
University of California at Berkeley, University of Michigan, and Northwestern University law schools. All 
errors are my own responsibility.   
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3I- Introduction 
 
The performance of the developing world in the global economy over the last decades is 
unprecedented since the industrial revolution. In the 18 centuries until 1820, developing 
countries produced, on average, around 80% of the global economic output.2 But 
developing countries were then left behind by Europe's industrial revolution in the 19th 
Century, and by 1950, developing countries´ share had fallen to 40% of global output.3
However, the developed countries´ dominance of the global economy since the industrial 
revolution may be over. In 2005, the combined output of developing countries rose above 
half of the global total.4 This growth is broadly spread: Brazil, China, India and Russia 
account for only two-fifths of emerging-world output.5
Developing countries have become increasingly important markets for companies from the 
developed world: over half of the combined exports of the European Union, Japan and the 
United States of America go to emerging economies. Moreover, the rich economies´ trade 
with emerging economies is growing twice as fast as their trade with one another.6
The increasing economic interaction between the developed and developing worlds is 
producing a number of consequences.7 These include the growing relevance of those parts 
of international law that link both worlds, such as the asymmetric tax treaty network. The 
asymmetric tax treaty network consists of bilateral tax treaties concluded between 
developed and developing countries. The word “asymmetric” denotes unequal investment 
flows between contracting states: while developing countries normally are capital 
importers, developed countries habitually are capital exporters. The United Kingdom-Chile 
tax treaty is an example of an asymmetric tax treaty because investment flows between 
those two contracting states are presumably unequal.  
 
The asymmetric tax treaty network of leading developed countries is substantial. For 
example, the United Kingdom’s asymmetric tax treaty network represents about 73% of its 
whole tax treaty network, and the United States’ asymmetric tax treaty network represents 
about 53 % of its entire tax treaty network. 8
2 Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, Development Centre Studies, OECD 
2001, at 27 (maintaining that “in the year 1000, Asia (except Japan) produced more than two thirds of world 
GDP, Western Europe less than 9 percent. In 1820 the proportions were 56 and 24 per cent respectively. In 
1998, the Asian share was about 30 per cent compared with 46 per cent for Western Europe and Western 
Offshoots combined”). 
3 Emerging Economies. Climbing back, The Economist, 69-70, January 21, 2006 (arguing that “since their 
industrial revolutions in the 19th century, the rich countries of the ´first world´ have dominated the global 
economy. By one measure at least, that era may be over. According to estimates by The Economist, in 2005 
the combined output of emerging (or developing) economies rose above half of the global total”). 
4 Emerging economies, note _ , ibidem (measuring the growth of the global economic output in purchasing-
power parity).  
5 The Balance of Economic Power in the World is Changing, The Economist, at 13, September 16, 2006. 
6 The New Titans. A Survey of the World Economy, The Economist, 3-4, September 16, 2006. 
7 See, for example, Dancing with Giants: China, India and the Global Economy, World Bank, forthcoming 
(arguing that China and India may influence global norms, tastes, business models, and so forth).  
8 See Section II. 
4The asymmetric and symmetric9 tax treaty networks constitute the core structure of the 
international tax system.10 Both networks are fundamentally based on a single bilateral tax 
treaty model designed in the early 20th Century and embodied in the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
(OECD model) since 1963.11 
This Article offers an answer to two fundamental questions about the asymmetric tax treaty 
network. First, it elaborates a theory for explaining why a representative developing 
country is willing to conclude tax treaties with developed countries on the basis of the 
OECD model. This first question is crucial for understanding the emergence of the 
asymmetric tax treaty network since the OECD model presupposes a number of elements 
that are regularly absent in the developing world.12 Second, this Article endeavours to 
explain the structure of incentives that the courts of a representative developing country 
normally has when construing OECD-based tax treaties in the foreign direct investment 
(FDI) area. This second question is relevant to understanding the evolution of the 
asymmetric tax treaty network given that, for example, case law may be relevant in tax 
treaty renegotiation. Game theory is used as a theoretical framework for answering both 
questions.  
 
9 The symmetric tax treaty network refers to tax treaties in which there are approximately equal investment 
flows between contracting states. Tax treaties concluded between developed countries (such as the US-UK tax 
treaty) or between developing countries (such as the Argentine-Brazilian tax treaty) are examples of 
symmetric tax treaties. 
10 The literature on the international tax regime is broad and deep; only certain elements can be highlighted 
here. Excellent recent surveys of the entire international tax regime are the following: Diane Ring, 
International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications, Tax Law Review (Fall 2006/Winter 2007) (Ring offers 
a theory for explaining when and under what circumstances countries are able to reach agreement on conflicts 
over international taxation). Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallisation — realities, 
experiences and opportunities, 56 Tax Law Review 259 (2003). Brauner outlines a general conceptual 
framework for achieving a world tax regime via a multilateral tax treaty that might be implemented in stages. 
Ian Roxan, Limits to Globalization — Some implications for taxation in the developing world (2003) 
(unpublished manuscript on file with author). Roxan does not share the negative view of the effects of 
globalization on taxation in the developing world. Michael Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate 
Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 Tax Law Review 261 (2001), which argues 
that the current international income tax regime lacks a satisfactory normative basis. Richard Vann, 
International Aspects of Income Tax, in Tax Law Design and Drafting, (International Monetary Fund, 
Volume 2, 719-810, 1998). Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: a Proposal for 
Simplification, 74 Texas Law Review 1301 (1996), which, as its title indicates, identifies the structure of in-
ternational taxation and its normative underpinnings. Sol Piccioto, International Business Taxation, A Study 
in the Internationalization of Business Regulation (1992), which is an historical account of the evolution of 
corporate income taxation. Adrian Ogley, The Principles of International Tax: a Multinational Perspective 
(1993), which provides a brief and illuminating general overview. 
11 For a detailed analysis of the OECD Model, see Philip Baker, Double Taxation Conventions. A Manual on 
the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, Thomson, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003.   
12 See Section V. See also Eduardo Baistrocchi, The Transfer Pricing Problem: A Proposal for Simplification, 
The Tax Lawyer, Winter 2006, forthcoming (arguing that the OECD model presupposes two major elements: 
i) symmetric flow of cross border income between tax treaty partners; ii) a decentralized network of domestic 
courts capable of producing case law with public good features). 
5The two inquiries referred to in the previous paragraph are related to each other. This is so 
because this paper assumes that the same strategic interaction among developing countries 
in international taxation explains both the emergence and evolution of the asymmetric tax 
treaty network.13 I will leave for another day the issue of what explains the emergence and 
evolution of the OECD model and the symmetric tax treaty network. 
 
The Article is divided into six parts. After this introduction, Part II focuses on two 
conceptual elements. First, it defines competition within a compatible standard (as 
something different from competition between incompatible standards). Second, it 
addresses one major consequence of competition within a compatible standard: the 
emergence of network markets such as the telephone system.  
 
Part III studies the strategic interaction among representative developing countries in the 
area of international taxation (the first strategic interaction). Part III maintains that there is 
a prisoner’s dilemma among developing countries in the foreign direct investment arena 
that triggers harmful international tax competition among developing countries. The recent 
Indian Supreme Court decision in re Union of India is used as a case-study. 
 
Part IV explores the strategic interaction between developed and developing countries in 
the area of international taxation (the second strategic interaction). It argues that a 
representative developing country has the incentive to conclude OECD-based tax treaties 
with developed countries for two different, but compatible reasons. First, the prisoner’s 
dilemma among developing countries referred to above induces developing countries to 
follow the OECD model for fear of driving FDI away to competing jurisdictions if all other 
conditions are equal.  
 
Second, the OECD model induces the emergence of a network market of international tax 
systems that has the standard features of all network markets. For example, the OECD-
based network market of international tax systems conveys positive network externalities 
only to those countries (including developing countries) that are members of the OECD-
based tax treaty network. Instances of positive network externalities emerging from the 
OECD-based tax treaty network are the following two: first, the minimization of 
communication and enforcement costs of the relevant tax treaty network; second, 
reputational advantages over otherwise comparable rivals who do not belong to the tax 
treaty network.14 
Part V extends the theory on the emergence of the asymmetric tax treaty network to the 
area of tax treaty interpretation in the developing world. Part V elaborates two points. First, 
it argues that central provisions of the OECD model are predominantly standards-based 
(rather than rules-based). Hence, the precise meaning of those provisions is not certain ex-
ante. Their precise meaning can only be determined ex-post through case law (or something 
functionally equivalent to case law). Second, given the standard nature of the OECD model, 
courts normally have enough room to strategically choose between competing (sometimes 
opposing) constructions equally consistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
 
13 See Sections IV and V. 
14 See Section IV.  
6Treaties. Part V assumes that developing countries´ courts – consistent with the individual 
interest of their own countries - are influenced by the prisoner’s dilemma and network 
externalities arguments referred to above.15 Consequently, developing countries’ courts 
have the incentive to construe the local tax treaty network in the foreign direct investment 
arena in favour of the taxpayer (rather than the tax authority). Once again, the recent Indian 
Supreme Court decision in re Union of India is used as a case-study. Part VI concludes. 
 
II- Some Conceptual Issues 
 
The world has experienced two globalization booms and one bust over the past two 
centuries. The first boom started about 1820, and lasted until the advent of World War I. 
The second began at the end of World War II and has continued since.  The inter-war years 
witnessed a retreat from this otherwise continuous shift towards greater global integration.
 
16 
 
One major consequence of the globalization movement was the emergence in the late 19th 
century of a novel strategic problem among nations: how to divide the international tax 
base in the absence of a higher authority. 
 
Developed countries eventually reached a 
fundamental consensus on how to solve this problem.17
 
That consensus is currently 
embodied in the OECD model which is the foundation of a network of over 2500 bilateral 
tax treaties that are either symmetric or asymmetric.18 
The asymmetric tax treaty network represents a substantial part of the entire tax treaty 
network. The United States and United Kingdom’s asymmetric tax treaty networks are 
assumed to be representative examples. As of January 2006, the US tax treaty network 
comprises sixty-three tax treaties, of which thirty-four are asymmetric.19 Thus, the US 
asymmetric tax treaty network represents about 53% of its whole tax treaty network. The 
United Kingdom tax treaty network comprises one hundred and thirteen tax treaties, of 
which eighty three tax treaties are asymmetric. Hence, the UK asymmetric tax treaty 
 
15 See Section III. 
16 Jeffrey G. Williamson, Winners and Losers over Two Centuries of Globalization (NBER Working Paper 
N° 9161, 1992), at http://post.econom-ics.harvard.edu/faculty/jwilliam/papers/w9161.pdf (last visited 
December 14, 2003). 
17This consensus was suggested in the seminal Report on Double Taxation, League of Nations Doc. E.F.S. 73 
F. 19 (1923). 
18 On the definitions of symmetric and asymmetric tax treaties see Section I. 
19 The standard that should be used to determine if a country is developed or developing is a controversial 
question. This Article assumes that all OECD members are developed countries whereas all non-OECD 
members are assumed to be developing countries. The US asymmetric tax treaties are those concluded with 
the following 34 developing countries because investment flows between contracting states are assumed to be 
unequal: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Barbados, Belarus, Bermuda, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Morocco, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad Tobago, Tunisia, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, and Venezuela. Conversely, the United States symmetric tax treaties are 
those concluded with the following 29 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea,  Luxembourg, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (See the IBFD Tax Treaty data base at 
http://online2.ibfd.org/cl/).  
7network represents about 73% of its whole tax treaty network.20 These data can be showed 
in graphic format as follows.  
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20 The UK asymmetric tax treaties are those concluded with the following 83 developing countries and 
associated territories (such as the Falklands Islands) because, as noted before, investment flows between 
contracting states are assumed to be unequal: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei, Bulgaria, Chile, 
China, Croatia, Cyprus, Dominica, Egypt, Falklands Islands, Fiji, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, 
Guernsey, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Isle of Man, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jersey, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, 
Mauritius, Mongolia, Montserrat, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New 
Guinea, Philippines, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, 
South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Christopher and Nevis, Sudan, Swaziland, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe. Conversely, the UK symmetric tax treaties are assumed to be the following 30: Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Korea,  Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, 
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,  and the United States (See the IBFD Tax Treaty data 
base at http://online2.ibfd.org/cl/.) 
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Conventional wisdom maintains that the emergence of the international tax regime is a 
miracle.21 This is so, the argument goes, because taxes are the last topic on which a 
Hobbesian observer would have predicted sovereign nations to reach a consensus given the 
zero-sum nature of the game: one’s country gain in revenue is another’s loss. This Article 
argues, however, that the emergence of a core part of the international tax regime (i.e., the 
asymmetric tax treaty network) is not a miracle, but rather an intelligible, sometimes failed, 
attempt to solve the problems arising from the strategic interaction among nations for the 
division of the international tax base.  
 
Demonstrating that the emergence of the asymmetric tax treaty network is not a miracle 
requires the discussion of some conceptual issues of game theory.22 Game theory is 
particularly well suited to international tax relations because the lack of higher authority 
places nations in a situation of pure strategic interaction, where they are solely concerned 
with the limits that the behaviour of others places on their own pursuit of self-interest.23 
21 Reuven Avi Yonah seems to have been the first author to coin the idea that the international tax regime is a 
miracle. He maintains that “the current international tax regime is a flawed miracle”. See Reuven S. Avi 
Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 Texas Law Review 1301, 
1303. In a similar vein, Yariv Brauner refers to the “miraculous equilibrium achieved almost, solely, thanks to 
tax treaties” (See Yariv Brauner, note 4, at 43 of the digital version of his paper).  
22 Game theory is the formal analysis of interaction where the gains and losses of participants partly depend 
on what others do. It assumes that everyone is instrumentally rational, that is, it assumes that every participant 
will pursue his subjective ends by choosing the course of action that, given his belief, is both conductive to 
that end and is personally the least costly. For an introduction to game theory, see Douglas Baird, Robert 
Gertner & Randal Picker, Game Theory and the Law (1994).  
23 Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, in Cooperation under Anarchy, 28 (1986). He 
argues that “the purpose of any theory –including game theory- is not to reproduce reality but to increase our 
understanding of fundamental processes by simplifying it. For this reason, it is not desirable to incorporate all 
of the details of any individual case. Simplicity and abstraction guide us through a morass of information to 
focus on more fundamental issues”.  For a sceptical view on the explanatory potential of game theory and 
international relations, see Fernando Tesón, A Philosophy of international law, Chapter 3 (1998) (arguing that 
game theory is unable to explain moral decisions made by States.) The literature of international taxation and 
game theory produced by international lawyers is small. Seminal papers in this area are the following: Charles 
91- Two Basic Types of Competition 
 
This section refers two different sorts of competition that illuminate the strategic interaction 
among developing countries in international taxation: competition between incompatible 
standards and competition within a compatible standard.24 Both types of competition are 
outlined below. 
 
a- Competition between Incompatible Standards 
 
One central feature of competition between incompatible standards is the lack of 
cooperation between competitors. A familiar example of competition between incompatible 
standards is the Philips and Sony battle in the videocassette recorder industry over 
VHS/Betamax standards. Their lack of cooperation in the design of a compatible standard 
meant that users of Betamax were unable to use VHS tapes in their machines (and vice-
versa). The competition between incompatible standards eventually led to the victory of 
VHS and the defeat of its rival Betamax.25 In order to avoid repeating the VHS/Betamax 
battle, Philips and Sony agreed to compete within a compatible standard in the compact 
disk industry. 
 
b- Competition within a Compatible Standard 
Philips and Sony agreed on a compact disk standard and licensed their technology to 
competitors. This triggered the emergence of competition within a compatible standard in 
the compact disc industry. Agreeing on a compatible standard may eliminate competition 
between technologies, but it does not eliminate competition altogether. Instead, it channels 
competition into other dimensions, such as price, service, and product features.26 
Competition within a compatible standard can be modelled as a co-opetition game.27 That 
is, a game in which elements of cooperation and competition are mixed simultaneously. For 
example, both Philips and Sony cooperated in the design of a compatible standard (e.g., the 
CD format), and they competed in the CD market in areas such as price, service, and 
product features.28 
Kingston, The Coherence of International Taxation, 81 Columbia Law Review 1151 (1981) (arguing that tax 
systems do interact and the implications of this; he maintains that the main players of the international tax 
game are countries and that countries compete for revenues, investments, markets, and jobs); Tsilly Dagan, 
National Interests in the International Tax Game, 18 Virginia Tax Review 363 (1998) (arguing that countries 
play as self-interested players in the international tax game; footnote 40 of Dagan’s paper maintains that the 
international tax game is a repeated game played infinitely).   
24 See Standley M. Besen & Joseph Farell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in 
Standardization, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 8, Number 2, Spring 1994, pages 117-131. The 
relevance of distinguishing between these two different types of competition in international taxation is 
outlined in Section II.2 below.    
25 Ibidem, at 118 (describing the Betamax/VHS competition). 
26 Ibidem. 
27 Adam M. Brandenburger & Barry J. Nalebuff, Co-opetition, Currency Doubleday (1996). 
28 See Standley M. Besen & Joseph Farell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in 
Standardization, op. cit.  
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In sum, given certain conditions, a co-opetition game emerges. That is, self-interested 
players cooperate to create a bigger market, but compete to divide it up. Hence, there are 
simultaneous elements of cooperation and competition at work among those players.29 
One key consequence of competition within a compatible standard is the creation of a 
network market, i.e., an environment where users can interact at a relatively low transaction 
cost. For example, since the CD format is universally accepted by all CD producers, users 
are able to interact at a lower transaction cost than would be the case if CD producers were 
competing among incompatible standards.   
 
Network markets normally have three main features: i) network externalities; ii) 
expectation and iii) lock-in effect. Network externalities denote that the larger the number 
of members of the network, the better for each of them. The classic example of network 
externalities is the telephone. Indeed, the relative value of having a telephone is related to 
the number of telephones being used.30 
Expectation is another feature in any network market. In effect, one standard may prevail 
over another not because it is better but because it is sponsored by an influential player. For 
example, the initial success of MS-DOS is usually attributed not to any technical 
superiority but to its support by IBM.31 
A lock-in effect is frequent in any network market because better products that arrive later 
may be unable to displace a technologically inferior one that arrived earlier. An example of 
the lock-in effect is the QWERTY typewriter keyboard.32 
2- The International Tax System as a Network Market              
 
The analysis of this Article is premised on the following three major assumptions. First, 
developing countries are habitually engaged in international tax competition within a 
compatible standard (rather than between incompatible standards). The current compatible 
standard is the OECD model, which channels international tax competition into areas that 
are not regulated by the OECD Model, such as the inclusion of clauses like most–favoured- 
nation in asymmetric tax treaties.33 Second, the OECD-based tax treaty network is a 
network market of decentralized international tax regimes that has the standard features of 
all network markets: externalities, expectations, and lock-in effects.34 Third, the OECD 
model compatible standard is capable of destroying incompatible standards (such as the 
 
29 Ibidem. 
30 Ibidem. 
31 Ibidem. 
32 Standley M. Besen & Joseph Farell, supra note _ (describing the QWERTY case as an example of lock-in 
effect in network markets.) 
33 See Section IV.1.a (offering examples of asymmetric tax treaties that include most-favoured-nation clauses 
(MFN). The OECD model does not even refer to the MFN clause).  
34 See Section IV.1.b (providing examples of externalities, expectations and lock-in effects of the OECD- 
based tax treaty network).  
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Andean Model)35 and inducing other, different, but compatible standards (such as the 
United Nations model) to gradually converge towards the OECD Model.36 
III- The Strategic Interaction among Developing Countries 
 
There are several macroeconomic differences between developed and developing 
countries.37 One main difference is that developing countries have not yet reached a 
sufficient level of national income to yield the domestic savings necessary to finance the 
investment required for further growth.38 Thus, developing countries normally have a 
relatively compelling need for inward investment vis-à–vis developed countries to finance, 
for example, public goods. This need has triggered international tax competition among 
developing countries to attract inward investment that has been apparent since at least the 
end of World War II.39 International tax competition was facilitated by the increasing 
mobility of capital, which was in turn accelerated by such technological advances as the 
electronic transfer of funds and improved long-distance communication.40 
This section focuses on the strategic interaction among developing countries in 
international taxation. It argues that there is a prisoner’s dilemma among developing 
countries in the area of foreign direct investment that induces developing countries to incur 
in harmful international tax competition. To illustrate, I shall focus on the Supreme Court 
of India decision in re Union of India. This Article assumes that Union of India is a 
representative case of international tax competition among developing countries. 
 
1- China versus India: The Union of India Case   
 
The case of Union of India and Anr vs. Azadi Bachao Andolan and Anr (the Union of India 
case) was decided by the Supreme of Court of India on 7 October 2003. The facts of the 
case, the main issue, and the holding of the Indian Supreme Court are as follows.  
 
Foreign investors, both institutional and direct, many of them from OECD countries, had 
been massively channelling their investment into India via Mauritius (rather than 
channelling them from OECD countries directly into India). Those investors had decided to 
utilize the Indo-Mauritius tax treaty because of its advantageous tax features (tax treaty 
shopping). 
 
35 See Section III.3.a (focusing on the incompatibility of the OECD and Andean Models and the virtual 
irrelevance of the Andean model in international taxation). 
36 See Section III.3.b (offering an explanation of why the evolution of the UN model is towards an increasing 
convergence with the OECD model.)   
37 According to the World Bank, as of 2003, there are 208 countries in the world. While 56 are developed 
countries, the remaining 152 are developing countries. That is, over 73% of all countries are developing ones. 
See World Investment Report (2003) available at 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=2412&lang=1.
38 See Dictionary of Economics, Graham Bannock, R.E. Baxer, Evans Davis, Penguin, Sixth Edition, at 104 
(1998). 
39 See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Globalisation, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State 113 
Harvard Law Review 1573 at 1575 (2000). 
40 Ibidem. 
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The scheme was structured via a conduit company based in Mauritius to channel 
investment from, say, the Netherlands to India in such a way as to subject capital gains to 
double non-taxation. For example, the alienation of shares of companies based in India 
controlled from a conduit company based in Mauritius was not subject to capital gains in 
either India or Mauritius under the Indo-Mauritius tax treaty. Moreover, that flow of 
income was not taxed by Netherlands domestic law. 41 
The use of this sort of tax treaty shopping scheme had resulted in an increase of funds 
coming into India from 37.5 million Rupees in 1993 to 61.7 billion Rupees in the year 
2001.42 It was basically produced by the interaction of the Indo-Mauritius Tax Treaty and 
Mauritius domestic tax law, according to which conduit companies based in Mauritius are 
exempted from both India and Mauritius taxes on the capital gains made on the sale of 
shares of Indian companies. 
 
The main issue before the Indian Supreme Court was whether the tax treaty shopping was 
valid under the Indo-Mauritius tax treaty, considering that the only justification for 
channelling the investment in that way was tax avoidance. The Indian Supreme Court 
described the term “tax treaty shopping” as “a graphic expression used to describe the act 
of a resident of a third country taking advantage of a fiscal treaty between two contracting 
states.”43 
The Indian Supreme Court decided the case in favour of the taxpayer. It argued that the tax 
treaty shopping at issue in this case was lawful and reversed the lower court decision. The 
Supreme Court elaborated two independent arguments for backing its decision. These two 
arguments are based on law and economics, and legal considerations, respectively. The 
Indian Supreme Court elaborated its law-and-economics analysis as follows. It focused on 
the cost/benefit implications of tax treaty shopping as a vehicle for attracting FDI to India. 
 
“Developing countries need foreign investments, and the treaty 
shopping opportunities can be an additional factor to attract them. The 
use of Cyprus as a treaty haven has helped capital inflows into Eastern 
Europe. Madeira (Portugal) is attractive for investments into the 
European Union. Singapore is developing itself as a base for 
investments in South East Asia and China. Mauritius today provides a 
suitable treaty conduit for South Asia and South Africa. In recent years, 
India has been the beneficiary of significant funds through the 
‘Mauritius conduit’. Although the Indian economic reforms since 1991 
 
41 Channelling an investment by a Dutch Corporation in India through a conduit company in Mauritius (M-
corp) by equity contributions to the M-corp, which acquires the company in India, is relatively simple in the 
case that the Dutch participation exemption applies to the shareholding in M-corp. In that case, dividends 
from and capital gains on the shares in the M-corp might be exempted from tax in the Netherlands. I am 
grateful to Professor Heiko Lohuis from the University of Leiden for this example. 
42 Union of India case, paragraph 127. 
<http://www.lexsite.com/home.asp?destination=lexdoc.asp?DocId=213107>. See also Jayanthi Iyengar, 
Mauritius Tax Loophole Under Indian Scrutiny, Asia Times, December 5, 2002  
http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/corrupt/2002/1205mauritius.htm
43 Union of India case, paragraph 113. 
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permitted such capital transfers, the amount would have been much 
lower without the India-Mauritius tax treaty.”44 
“The developing countries allow treaty shopping to encourage capital 
and technology inflows, which developed countries are keen to provide 
to them. The loss of revenue could be insignificant compared to the 
other non-tax benefits to their economy.”45
Treaty shopping “is perhaps regarded in contemporary thinking as a 
necessary evil in a developing country.”46 
The Indian Supreme Court then elaborated a legal (rather than a cost/benefit) argument for 
backing the treaty shopping focused on in this case. It compared the wording of the Indo-
US and the Indo-Mauritius tax treaties in the areas of anti-avoidance methods, concluding 
that treaty shopping is invalid under the former and valid under the latter.  The Court said: 
 
“Article 24 of the Indo-US tax treaty is in marked contrast with the 
Indo-Mauritius tax treaty. The appellants rightly contend that in the 
absence of a limitation clause, such as the one contained in Article 24 
of the Indo-U.S. Treaty, there are no disabling or disentitling 
conditions under the Indo-Mauritius Treaty prohibiting the resident of 
a third nation from deriving benefits thereunder.”47 Hence, treaty 
shopping “…may have been intended at the time when the Indo-
Mauritius tax treaty was entered into.”48 
Finally, the Court construed domestic anti-avoidance provisions, such as the business 
purpose test, in such a restrictive way as to severely limit their scope in the tax treaty area. 
The Court argued as follows: 
 
“…[T]he taxpayer, where he is in a position to carry through a 
transaction in two alternative ways, one of which will result in 
liability to tax and the other of which will not, is at liberty to choose 
the latter and to do so effectively in the absence of any specific tax 
avoidance provision.”49 
The Supreme Court of India did not refer to the commentary to Article 1 of the OECD 
model, which implicitly bars tax treaty shopping. This omission could be justified on two 
alternative grounds. First, the Supreme Court of India implicitly decided that the OECD 
model Commentary is not binding on India in light of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties.50 Second, the Supreme Court of India implicitly followed a static (rather than 
an ambulatory) interpretation of the Indo-Mauritius tax treaty. Hence, the OECD 
 
44 Ibidem, paragraph 135. 
45 Ibidem, paragraph 136. 
46 Ibidem, paragraph 137. 
47 Ibidem, paragraph 115. 
48 Ibidem, paragraph 137. 
49 Ibidem, paragraph 144. 
50 See Philip Baker, Double Taxation Conventions. A Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on 
Income and on Capital, Thomson, Sweet & Maxwell, 2003 (arguing that it is debatable if the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties requires contracting states to follow the OECD Model commentary if 
those contracting states are non-members of the OECD).   
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commentary on tax treaty shopping is irrelevant in this case given that it was published 
after (rather than before) the 1983 conclusion of the Indo-Mauritius tax treaty.  
 
In short, the holding of the Supreme Court of India in re Union of India is as follows. Tax 
treaty shopping is valid under the Indian tax treaty network, unless there is a specific tax 
treaty prohibition, such as a Limitation of Benefit Clause. Moreover, general, domestic 
anti-avoidance provisions (e.g., the business purpose test) cannot be applied to address tax 
treaty shopping cases.  
 
The holding of the Supreme Court of India arguably creates a (controversial) taxpayer right. 
Indeed, it grants taxpayers the right to implement tax treaty shopping schemes that produce 
double non-taxation outcomes.   
 
As noted earlier, this Article assumes that Union of India is a representative case of 
international tax competition among developing countries. It can be modelled as a 
prisoner’s dilemma as follows. 
 
India 
 Cooperate                                 Defect 
 
Cooperate              2,2                                         4,1 
 
China 
 
Defect                    1,4                                         3,3 
 
Prisoner’s dilemma among developing countries in the FDI area 
 
In the matrix above, both players are developing countries: India and China. Both countries 
had concluded bilateral tax treaties with Mauritius, and it is assumed that China is as good 
as India at attracting FDI.51 They are competing with each other to attract FDI, let us also 
assume, major foreign investments from OECD countries such as the Netherlands (foreign 
investor). India and China may choose between two alternative strategies: to cooperate with 
the other player by not engaging in harmful tax competition and considering tax treaty 
shopping invalid (cooperate), or to engage in harmful tax competition by considering tax 
treaty shopping lawful (defect). Let us also assume that there are no other actors that can 
influence the decisions of these two players. Each country has only to consider the 
 
51 Both China and India have concluded bilateral tax treaties with Mauritius. For example, the Income Tax 
Agreement and Final Protocol concluded by China (P.R.C.) and Mauritius was entered into on August 1, 
1994. It is available in LEXIS, World Tax Treaties. 
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behaviour of the other country. The matrix above shows a possible structure of payoffs in 
such a situation.52 
This strategic interaction of India and countries such as China arguably explains why the 
Indian Supreme Court had the incentive to hold that tax treaty shopping is lawful.53 The 
following Indian Supreme Court words dramatically reflected its awareness of the 
prisoner’s dilemma in which India was involved: “[Treaty shopping] is a necessary evil in a 
developing economy.”54 
In sum, the Union of India case suggests that developing countries normally have the 
incentive to offer mutually harmful tax incentives to potential foreign direct investors 
because developing countries do not have better options for attracting them given the 
prisoner’s dilemma in which they are involved. Hence, developing countries tend to offer a 
variety of tax incentives even in those cases in which the foregone tax revenue exceeds the 
increase in the desired foreign direct investment.55 
The harmful international tax competition referred to above has led a number of developing 
countries to gradually mutate into some type of production tax haven (103 as of 1998).56 
This scenario arguably explains the gradual decline of tax revenues from corporate income 
taxation in the developing world. From 1990 to 2001, corporate tax rates declined in both 
developed and developing countries. However, in developed countries that decline in the 
rates was matched by a broadening of the tax base, so that no decline in revenues can be 
observed; in developing countries, the same period witnessed a decline of corporate tax 
 
52 The symbols in this matrix are as follows. One player, India, is represented in the column; the other player, 
China, is represented in the row.  As said, both players can choose to cooperate or not to cooperate. This 
generates four possible combinations for those two individual choices. The numbers stand for the payoff for 
each combination, ordinarily ranked (Thus, for each player 1>2>3>4). In this matrix, India’s best outcome (1) 
is to offer a tax incentive to the foreign investor when China does not do so (i.e. 4,1). Hence, the foreign 
investor will prefer India over China for locating its investment provided all other things are equal between 
both countries. India’s worst outcome (4) is the reverse, that is, to cooperate unilaterally, and thus become 
vulnerable to China’s tax incentive (i.e. 1,4). India’s second best outcome (2) occurs if both cooperate by not 
incurring in harmful tax competition (i.e. 2,2). Thus, the chosen country would be able to tax this business 
activity, and hence raise revenue to finance the public goods desired by its constituents. India’s third best 
outcome (3) is to incur in harmful tax competition (i.e. 3,3). This is worse than avoiding harmful tax 
competition (because it forces India to collect less than optimum tax revenues), but better than cooperating 
unilaterally. The same analysis holds for China: to take advantage of the other’s party naïveté is the best 
outcome (cooperate when the other party does not); mutual cooperation is the second best outcome (to 
mutually avoid harmful tax competition); mutual defection is the third best outcome (to mutually incur in 
harmful tax competition); and unrequired cooperation (limiting harmful tax competition unilaterally) is the 
worst outcome. 
The dominant strategy for each country caught in this dilemma is not to cooperate, that is to incur in harmful 
tax competition. Because both countries reason in a similar way, both will incur in harmful tax competition, 
thus reaching the lower left cell (3,3) in the matrix above, which is not a socially optimum point (2,2). 
53 See Section V.3.  
54 See the Union of India case, paragraph 137.    
55 See Jack M. Mintz & Thomas Tsiopoulos, Corporate Income Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment in 
Central and Eastern Europe 10 (1992).  
56 World Investment Report (1996). Production tax havens are jurisdictions that offer targeted tax incentives 
to foreign direct investments. See also Reuven Avi Yonah, supra note _. 
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revenues by about 20% on average.57 That decline is particularly important in light of the 
larger overall share of tax revenues produced by the corporate tax in developing countries 
(average of 17 percent, as opposed to 7 percent for developed countries). Most of the 
decline has been attributed to the spread of targeted tax incentives for multinational 
enterprises (MNEs). From 1990 to 2001, the percentage of developing countries granting 
tax holidays to MNEs grew from 45% to 58%, and similar trends can be seen in tax breaks 
for exporters (32% to 45%), reduced corporate rates for MNEs (40% to 60%), and free 
trade zones (17.5% to 45%).58 
The mutation of many developing countries into production tax havens sometimes is the 
first step towards achieving development. For example, Ireland originally mutated into a 
production tax haven in the software service area. As the Irish workforce and certain 
institutional elements improved over time, other high-value service areas emerged. Ireland 
eventually became a developed country within a few decades.59 
2- Is the Arm’s Length Standard Dormant in Developing Countries?  
 
The prisoner’s dilemma referred to above produces two major consequences. First, as seen, 
it explains the frequent mutation of developing countries into production tax havens. 
Second, it implies a growing gap between the law on the books and law in action in the area 
of international taxation in the developing world. This growing gap will be explored in this 
section using the arm’s length standard as a case study. 
 
Many developing countries have included in their tax legislation some of the measures 
requested by the OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition, such as transfer pricing 
regulations based on the OECD Guidelines.60 However, a representative developing 
country does not have the incentive to actually enforce transfer pricing regulations for fear 
of driving FDI away to other jurisdictions. As the United Nations has argued, “many 
developing countries are in a delicate position if they want to curb transfer pricing abuses 
without adversely affecting foreign investment flows”.61 
57 Michael Keen and Alejandro Simone, Is Tax Competition Harming Developing Countries More than 
Developed? Tax Notes International, June 28, 2004, p. 1317. See also World Bank, Tax Policy Handbook,
295-318 Washington D.C.  (1994).  
58 Ibidem. 
59 See Yoram Margalioth, Tax Competition, Foreign Direct Investment and Growth: Using the Tax System to 
Promote Developing Countries, 23 Virginia Tax Review 161 (2003). 
60 OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition: an Emerging Global Issue (1998). See, for example, Eduardo 
Baistrocchi, The Transfer Pricing Problem: The Argentine Experience (1932-1998), Revista de Teoría 
Jurídica, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Volumen 2, Número 1, November 2000.  
61 See Transfer Pricing Abuses and Developing Countries, published in the 1988 UN Report entitled 
International Income Taxation and Developing Countries.  An open question is why developing countries 
introduce norms into their legal system when it is clear ex ante that they will remain largely unforced (such as 
the arm’s length standard). One possible reason for this is that international lending institutions (like the 
International Monetary Fund) either explicitly or implicitly induce developing countries to adopt those norms. 
For example, in a book recently edited by the International Monetary Fund, it was suggested that developing 
countries should adopt the arm’s length standard at both tax treaty and domestic levels. It states: 
 
“A drafting issue for the domestic [tax] law is that the arm’s length principle 
should be provided for both branches and subsidiaries. This is most easily 
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This strategic scenario explains, for instance, the virtual absence of transfer pricing 
litigation in the developing world.62 Hence, this Article assumes that the arm’s length 
standard is normally dormant in the developing world, except in exceptional circumstances 
like the following three: a) countries that face difficulties in raising funds from the 
international capital market because, say, they have defaulted on sovereign debt; b) large 
developing countries in which inward investment is not deterred by transfer pricing 
enforcement because of the relatively large size of their domestic market; c) industries that 
cannot readily move their businesses elsewhere and are under-represented in the local 
political process.    
 
In the first group, the sovereign debt default has substantially limited a country’s ability to 
raise funds from the international capital market. This paper assumes that that inability to 
use the capital market has induced countries like Argentina to be aggressive in the 
enforcement of its international tax law in order to maximize tax revenue collection. This 
aggressive enforcement has produced inter alia, a wave of transfer pricing litigation in 
Argentina since 2003.  Not coincidentally, 2003 was the year after it defaulted on its 
sovereign debt.63 
In the second group, transfer pricing litigation occurs in jurisdictions such as Brazil and 
Mexico. These are markets large enough to be aggressive in the enforcement of transfer 
pricing regulations with limited fear of driving FDI to other jurisdictions. For example, tax 
assessments in Brazil related to transfer pricing adjustments have become a frequent 
occurrence and involve larger sums of money. While tax assessments unrelated to transfer 
pricing issues have an average assessed amount of BRL 2.7 million (approximately US 
$1.15 million), transfer pricing tax assessments have an average assessed amount of almost 
7.5 times higher, totalling on average BRL 20.2 million (approximately US $8.6 million).64 
done by using language similar to that found in tax treaties. Such an approach 
ensures that there is a basis in domestic law for making transfer pricing 
adjustments. In many countries, it is not clear whether tax treaties on their 
own would provide a sufficient basis for such adjustments, and, in any event, 
it is necessary to have the rules in the case of residents of countries with 
which there is no tax treaty in force. Using statutory language based on 
treaties has the added advantage of giving a clear signal that the country 
intends to follow international norms”, Richard Vann, International Aspects 
of Income Tax, at 782, published at Tax Law Design and Drafting, Victor 
Thuronyi editor, Volume 2, International Monetary Fund, 1998.   
 
62 For example, there is no registered developing countries´ case law on transfer pricing at the IBFD web site 
as of March 2006.   
63 Those multinational enterprises based in Argentina which extensively use intangibles, such as the 
automobile and pharmaceutical industries, are facing large transfer pricing litigation since the year Argentina 
defaulted its sovereign debt in 2002.  
64 See David Roberto R. Soares da Silva, Brazil Tightens Transfer Pricing Regime, Tax Notes Int'l, June 5, 
2006, p. 861. Tax treaty prevails over local transfer pricing rules, Brazilian Court Rules, Doc 2001-9960, 
April 3, 2001 (Discussing the Brazilian federal court injunction according to which the Brazil-German tax 
treaty prevails over Brazil’s domestic transfer pricing norms that are inconsistent with the arm’s length 
standard). 
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In the third group, transfer pricing litigation is focused on industries that cannot readily 
move to other jurisdictions and are under-represented in the local political process. This 
paper assumes that the Argentine industry of agricultural commodities (such as soya) is a 
case in point. Indeed, it is governed by a relatively stringent transfer pricing regulation that 
has already triggered transfer pricing litigation in this area.65 This type of agricultural 
commodity industry cannot readily move to other jurisdictions and is not labour intensive, 
which normally implies an under-representation in the local political process.     
3- Why the international tax regime has failed to solve the PD among Developing 
Countries 
 
As said, the strategic interaction among developing countries in the area of foreign direct 
investment is a prisoner’s dilemma, which triggers mutually harmful tax competition 
among developing countries. It is time to question why the international tax regime has 
been unable to solve such a prisoner’s dilemma.   
 
There are two central mechanisms for solving a prisoner’s dilemma.66 On the one hand, it 
may be solved through a contract entered into by the parties and enforced by an external 
authority capable of conveying a credible threat to the defecting party (the contract 
solution).67 
On the other hand, a prisoner’s dilemma may be solved via iteration, that is, being played 
repeatedly (iterated prisoner’s dilemma). The iterated prisoner’s dilemma may lead players 
to develop cooperative behaviour under the tit-for-tat rule, which means that players tend to 
start the game with cooperative behaviour, defecting only if the other player has defected 
on the previous move (the tit-for-tat solution).68 
A classic example of the tit-for-tat rule is the live-and-let-live system in trench warfare 
during World War I. German and British soldiers deployed in trench warfare were able to 
spontaneously reach cooperation among themselves according to which no British soldier 
would shoot to kill a German one unless the other had done it first (and vice-versa).69 
Tit-for-tat emerges if certain conditions are met. These conditions are the following: a) the 
relationship among the players shall be perceived as durable; b) cooperation shall be based 
on reciprocity; and c) the players shall have the ability to recognize defection when it 
occurs.70 That is, there shall be clarity of behaviour so that the other player can adapt to the 
first player’s pattern of action (i.e., the player must have the ability to retaliate for the other 
 
65 See Cristian Rosso Alba, 1/5/04 TAX NOTES INT'L 7 2004 WLNR 17744086  (maintaining that  
Argentina's transfer pricing regulation for related-party transactions involving agricultural commodities were 
made more stringent  for those transactions involving non-agricultural commodities).  
66 To solve a prisoner’s dilemma means to induce the players to deploy cooperative strategies capable of 
moving the equilibrium from the strictly dominant strategy (i.e. lower right cell) to a socially optimum 
outcome (i.e. upper left cell). 
67 See Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy, supra note _ at 102 
68 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Co-operation (1984).  
69 Id. at 29-182.  
70 Id at 140. 
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party’s uncooperative move).71 The basic idea is that a player must not be able to get away 
with defecting without the other individual being able to retaliate effectively. It is important 
for one player to know what the other player actually did on the previous move because tit-
for-tat always defects exactly once after each defection by the other.72 If these requirements 
are met, the prisoner’s dilemma may be solved spontaneously without legal intervention.  
 
Let us explore both mechanisms for solving a prisoner’s dilemma using international 
taxation as a case study. The contract and tit-for-tat solutions will be studied independently 
as follows. 
 
This Article assumes that in the area of inward investment, the states of the United States of 
America face a strategic interaction among themselves that is similar to that faced by 
developing countries. Both groups of tax jurisdictions have the incentive to engage in 
mutually harmful tax competition (such as the offering of location tax incentives) for 
promoting inward investment. This is because both groups of tax jurisdictions are involved 
in a prisoner’s dilemma.73 
Interestingly, the Constitution of the United States of America includes a legal device that 
tries to solve the prisoner’s dilemma in which the US states are involved. It is implemented 
through a provision that is functionally equivalent to a contract (the Commerce Clause) and 
that is enforced by an external authority (the federal judiciary).  
 
The Commerce Clause limits certain types of harmful tax competition among the states.74 
For example, the Commerce Clause prohibits states from giving tax incentives to 
businesses to locate in-state in the same way that it constrains states from providing other 
measures designed to set a state’s economy apart from the nation’s.75 Moreover, the US 
 
71 Id. at 29-182. 
72 Id. at 132. 
73 See Peter Henrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax 
Incentives, 110 Harvard Law Review 377, 396 (1996) (arguing that “the political cost of adopting tax breaks 
for business are lower than the cost of failing to participate aggressively in the incentives bidding competition. 
Consequently, the states find themselves caught in a classic prisoner’s dilemma. If all the states would refrain 
from deploying location incentives for business, then they all could retain more robust tax bases to support 
other governmental functions. But, if the other states are going to offer a widening array of tax breaks, then 
none can afford the cost –more political than economic- of abstaining”). See also Reuven Avi Yonah, 
Passport to Toledo: Cuno, the WTO, and the ECJ, 41 Tax Notes International 289, November 30, 2005 
(arguing that the state location incentives force the states into a prisoner’s dilemma). 
74 The Commerce Clause provided for in the United States constitution states the following: “The Congress 
shall have Power […] to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States […]”. There 
are many cases in which the US Supreme Court has effectively sanctioned the defecting behaviour of certain 
states because of having incurred in harmful tax competition among them. Main leading cases in the area of 
discrimination against interstate commerce are the following:   Bacchus Imports, Ltd. V. Dias, 468 US 263, 
104 S. Ct.   3049 (1984). In Bacchus, the US Supreme Court invalidated a tax incentive scheme implemented 
by Hawaii according to which only whisky produced in Hawaii (rather that produced elsewhere) would be 
exempt from certain local tax. The Supreme Court grounded its holding on the Commerce Clause. The 
Bacchus holding has a long progeny. See, for example, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. V. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 
(1985); New Energy Co. v. Limbach 486 US 269, 108 S. Ct. 1803 (1988).  
75 See Peter Henrich, supra note _.  
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Constitution grants the federal judiciary the role of an external authority with the power to 
sanction defecting states.  
 
The role of the Commerce Clause and the federal judiciary outlined in the previous 
paragraph is consistent with the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit in re Cuno.76 (The Court of Appeals decision was eventually reversed by the United 
States Supreme Court on procedural, rather than substantive, grounds. Hence, the Supreme 
Court may share the Court of Appeals holding on the merits in a future case.77)
This Article assumes that the Cuno case is a representative example of harmful tax 
competition among the US states through location incentives. In 1998, Daimler Chrysler 
entered into an agreement with the City of Toledo to construct a new vehicle-assembly 
plant near the company's existing facility in exchange for various tax incentives. Daimler 
Chrysler estimated that it would invest approximately $ 1.2 billion in this project, which 
would provide the region with several thousand new jobs. In return, the City and two local 
school districts agreed to give Daimler Chrysler a ten-year, 100 percent property tax 
exemption, as well as an investment tax credit of 13.5 percent against the state corporate 
franchise tax for certain qualifying investments. The total value of the tax incentives was 
estimated to be worth $ 280 million.78 
Ohio's investment tax credit grants a taxpayer a non-refundable credit against the state's 
corporate franchise tax if the taxpayer "purchases new manufacturing machinery and 
equipment during the qualifying period, provided that the new manufacturing machinery 
and equipment are installed in [Ohio]."79 The investment tax credit is generally 7.5 percent 
"of the excess of the cost of the new manufacturing machinery and equipment purchased 
during the calendar year for use in a county over the county average new manufacturing 
machinery and equipment investment for that county."80 The rate increases to 13.5 percent 
of the cost of the new investment if it is purchased for use in specific economically 
depressed areas.81 The credit may not exceed $ 1 million unless the taxpayer has increased 
its overall ownership of manufacturing equipment in the state during the year for which the 
credit is claimed.82 To the extent that the credit exceeds the corporation's total Ohio 
franchise tax liability in a particular year, the balance of the credit is carried forward and 
can be used to reduce its liability in any of the three following years.83 
76 Cuno v. Daimler Chrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2004). 
77 US Supreme Court certiorari granted by Daimlerchrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 2005 US 5422 (U.S. Sept. 27, 
2005). The US Supreme Court then vacated and remanded this case on procedural grounds (arguing that 
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue). See Daimlerchrysler Corp.. et al. v. Cuno et al.certiorari to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Argued March 1, 2006--Decided May 15, 2006 No. 04-1704. 
78 Cuno at 741 
79 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5733.33(B)(1). 
80 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5733.33(C)(1). 
81 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5733.33(C)(2), (A)(8)-(13). 
82 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5733.33(B)(2)(a). 
83 See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5733.33(D). Cuno at 741. 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the Ohio investment tax 
credit was inconsistent with the Commerce Clause provided by the US Constitution. This 
decision was grounded on the rationale that an investment credit is a location incentive that 
is an invalid state regulation of interstate commerce. 84 
The Court of Appeals decision in re Cuno successfully solves the said prisoner’s dilemma 
via a contract entered into by the States (i.e., the Commerce Clause) enforced by an 
external authority (i.e., the United States federal judiciary). Consequently, the US 
constitutional framework can solve the prisoner’s dilemma in which the US states are 
involved in the inward investment area. The European Union has implemented a legal 
framework similar to the United States Commerce Clause. It has been applied by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in a number of cases for solving the prisoner’s dilemma 
emerging from the location tax incentives area.85 
The United States legal framework has not been replicated in the international tax regime 
arena. There is an OECD Report that is functionally equivalent to the Commerce Clause, 
but unfortunately, there is no institution equivalent to an external authority capable of 
conveying a credible threat for defecting jurisdictions, such as the United States federal 
judiciary.  
 
The OECD 1998 Report entitled Harmful Tax Competition: an Emerging Global Issue 
(OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition) is functionally equivalent to the US 
Commerce Clause in the following respect. Both the Commerce Clause and the OECD 
Report on Harmful Tax Competition prohibit tax jurisdictions from establishing targeted 
location tax incentives for foreigners in order to promote inward investment. For example, 
the targeted tax incentives focused on the Cuno case are arguably prohibited by both the 
Commerce Clause and the OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition. 86 However, the 
 
84 Cuno at 750. 
85 See, for example, the Bobie and Humblot cases in which the ECJ barred location tax incentives in light of 
Article 95 of the EEC Treaty.  In re Bobie, the European Court of Justice held that “The levying by a member 
state of a tax on a product imported from another member state in accordance with a method of calculation or 
rules which differ from those used for the taxation of the similar domestic product, for example a flat-rate 
amount in one case and a graduated amount in another, would be incompatible with the first paragraph of 
article 95 of the EEC Treaty if the latter product were subject, even if only in certain cases, by reasons of 
graduated taxation, to a charge to tax lower than that on the imported product” (See Bobie Getrankevertrieb 
GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Aachen-Nord, Judgment of the Court of 22 June 1976). In a similar vein, the ECJ 
held in re Humblot the following. “Article 95 of the EEC Treaty prohibits the charging on cars exceeding a 
given power rating for tax purposes of a special fixed tax the amount of which is several times the highest 
amount of the progressive tax payable on cars of less than the said power rating for tax purposes, where the 
only cars subject to the special tax are imported, in particular from other member-States” (See Michel 
Humblot v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux, decided by the European Court of Justice on May 9, 1985). I am 
grateful to Tom O´Shea, from Queen Mary, University of London for noticing the functional similarity 
between the United States Commerce Clause and Article 95 of the EEC in the tax location incentive area.  
86 The OECD Report makes a distinction between tax competition in the form of generally applicable lower 
tax rates, and targeted tax regimes designed to attract foreign investors.  The OECD considers that the latter 
form of tax competition (unlike the former) should be deemed invalid. In effect, the OECD considers tax 
regimes designed to attract foreign investors are invalid if this goal is implemented through a system different 
from generally applicable tax rates (See Harmful Tax Competition: an Emerging Global Issue, OECD, at 34, 
1998, and Reuven Avi Yonah, Globalization and Tax Competition: Implications for Developing Countries, at 
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OECD is not functionally equivalent to the United States Federal Judiciary. It lacks the 
power to convey a centralised, credible threat to uncooperative jurisdictions.    
 
In sum, developing countries have been unable to enter into a treaty capable of solving their 
prisoner’s dilemma due to the lack of an external authority.87 Hence, the first method of 
solving a prisoner’s dilemma referred to above (i.e., by a contract) does not work in the 
international tax scenario. 
 
The relevant question at this point is the following: Why does an iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma not emerge among developing countries to spontaneously solve the harmful 
international tax competition in which they are involved? In order to answer this question, 
it is necessary to recall the elements required for “tit-for-tat” to emerge, and then to 
determine which of those elements are not met in the developing countries´ context.   
 
As discussed above, “tit-for-tat” emerges if certain conditions are met, namely that: a) the 
relationship between the players is perceived as durable; b) the cooperation is based on 
reciprocity; and c) the players have the ability to recognize defection when it occurs.88 
Clarity of behaviour must exist so that the players can adapt to the other player’s pattern of 
action; in other words, players must have the ability to retaliate in response to 
uncooperative moves made by the other players.89 The basic idea is that a player must not 
be able to get away with defecting without the other player being able to retaliate 
effectively. It is important for one player to know what the other player actually did on the 
previous move because tit-for-tat always defects exactly once after each defection by the 
other.90 If these requirements are met, the prisoner’s dilemma may be solved via iteration 
without external intervention.  
 
First, this paper assumes that developing countries´ political instability normally implies a 
frequent turnover of both governments and public officials (including those involved in tax 
matters). This turnover makes it difficult for reciprocity among countries to arise because, 
according to empirical tests done by Axelrod, tit-for-tat normally emerges if the identity of 
the players is relatively stable.  Hence, requirement “a” listed above is not normally met by 
developing countries. 
 
17, published at 
http://www.utdt.edu/departamentos/derecho/posgrado/pidt/Globalization_and_tax_competition.doc). In a 
similar vein, the US Commerce Clause constraints States from implementing tax incentives for promoting 
domestic economic activity. See Peter D. Enrich, supra note _ (arguing that the Commerce Clause precludes 
the states from efforts to channel or distort interstate economic activity. In the competition over location 
incentives, mobile multi-state businesses are not victims of state efforts but, in fact, are their primary 
beneficiaries. The harms fall instead on the states themselves, on the citizens who depend upon and pay for 
services provided by the state, and on the national economy). See also the Cuno case referred to above. 
87 Arbitration in tax matters still is an infrequent element in the tax treaty network. See, for example, David 
Tillinghast, Arbitration of Disputes under Income Tax Treaties,  97 Am. Soc'y Int'l. L. Proc. 107 (2003). 
88 Robert Axelrod, supra note _ at 140. 
89 Id. at 29-182. 
90 Id. at 132. 
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Second, this paper assumes that developing countries normally face high monitoring costs 
for identifying any defecting behaviour by their developing country counterparts. In effect, 
it is usually costly for a representative developing country to promptly identify the harmful 
tax incentives that another developing country may have introduced to its tax system. This 
is so for a number of reasons that include the following two. On the one hand, developing 
countries´ institutions (e.g., tax authorities) are not usually sophisticated enough to produce 
this key information in a timely manner. On the other hand, as already been argued, there 
normally is a substantial gap between the law on the books and law in action in the 
developing world. For example, there may be transfer pricing norms in a given developing 
country but they might have been implicitly abrogated by lack of enforcement.91 Hence, the 
requirements “b” and “c” according to which the players must have reciprocity and the 
ability to recognize defection when it occurs are not normally met by developing countries 
in the international tax area. 
 
In sum, it is difficult for “tit-for-tat” to emerge among developing countries in the area of 
international taxation. This prevents the prisoner’s dilemma from being spontaneously 
solved.  
 
Let us now explore two relevant attempts to accommodate the interests of developing 
countries in the international tax arena: the Andean and UN model tax conventions. The 
next section’s central question is why those attempts have failed to solve the 
aforementioned prisoner’s dilemma among developing countries. 
 
a- The Andean Model Tax Convention 
 
Five South American countries are Members of the Cartagena Agreement of 1969, which 
established a sub-regional common market in Latin America.92 They signed a multilateral 
tax agreement in 1971 along with a model tax convention, which should be used by 
Member States when negotiating bilateral tax treaties with non-member countries (the 
Andean Model Tax Convention (Andean MTC) or Andean model).  
 
The Andean MTC was intended to protect the taxing jurisdiction of Member States 
especially vis-à-vis developed countries. It is based on the source or territorial principle. It 
gives exclusive taxing power to the source country.93 The profits are taxable only in the 
state where the business activities are undertaken using a broad definition of permanent 
establishment.94 Royalties are only taxable where the technology is used.95 Interest from 
loans is taxable where the loan is used.96 Dividends are taxable where the company 
distributing the dividends is resident. Only the country where the property is located at the 
time of its disposal may tax capital gains. Personal services may only be taxed where the 
 
91 See Part III.2. 
92 These countries are Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela 
93 Andean MTC, Art. 4. 
94 For example, preparatory or auxiliary activities are deemed to be a PE. 
95 Andean MTC, Art. 9 
96 Id. Art. 10 
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services are performed. There are also provisions for exchange of information and mutual 
assistance on tax matters among the Contracting States  
 
The Andean MTC has been in force for over 30 years. It has never been used as the basis 
for a bilateral tax treaty among a developed and developing country arguably because no 
developed country was willing to accept the exclusive taxing power of the source country.97 
The Andean community tax treaty network is currently largely based on the OECD 
Model.98 There are only two tax treaties concluded between developing countries which are 
based on the Andean model.99 Thus, the Andean model is virtually irrelevant in 
international taxation.  
 
The Andean MTC can be seen as a failed attempt for two main reasons. First, the Andean 
model aims to solve the prisoner’s dilemma in which developing countries are involved. 
Both players are developing countries who are members of the Cartagena Agreement and 
both have two alternative individual choices: to defect or to cooperate. These options can 
be defined as follows. To defect means adopting residence based taxation (as provided for 
by the OECD model) when concluding tax treaties with developed countries. To cooperate 
means adopting source taxation (as provided for by the Andean model) when concluding 
tax treaties with developed countries. Unsurprisingly, the defecting option prevailed within 
the members of the Cartagena Agreement given: i) the lack of an external authority capable 
of sanctioning defecting behaviour of the players, and ii) the lack of emergence of a tit-for 
tat pattern of behaviour among the players.100 
Second, the Andean model can also be seen as an attempt to change the nature of the 
international tax competition among countries: from competition within a compatible 
standard (the OECD model) into a competition between incompatible standards (the OECD 
and Andean models). The OECD and Andean models are incompatible because while the 
OECD model has a residence bias, the Andean Model has a source bias. 101 The Andean 
 
97 James Husban, The Andean Pact Model Convention as Viewed by the Capital Exporting Countries, 59-64, 
in Fiscal Harmonization in the Andean Countries (1975). 
98 Ronald E. Evans, The Expanding Role of Income Tax Treaties in Planning Latin American Ventures, Tax 
Notes Int'l 1471 (Sept. 25, 2000), available in LEXIS, WTD file. 
99 The Andean MTC has only been used in two bilateral treaties among developing countries: the Argentina-
Chile and Argentina-Bolivia tax treaties. See Ronald Evans, Régimen Jurídico de la Doble Tributación 
Internacional 170-193 (1999). 
100 See Section III.3 for an explanation of why tit-for-tat does not normally emerge among developing 
countries in the international taxation area. The Andean Community overlooked international tax competition 
among developing countries in the area of Foreign Direct Investment. In effect, the Andean Community 
behaved as if it were a cartel that could withhold the provision of natural resources in order to induce 
developed countries to accept the source principle as the exclusive jurisdiction to tax. In other words, the 
Andean Community strategy when passing the Andean MTC would have been understandable if it were in a 
position similar to the OPEC countries in the oil industry during the 1970s (that succeeded in pushing world 
oil prices well above what they would have been in a competitive market by restraining output). Of course, 
this is not the case of the Andean Community because they are not a cartel; this paper assumes that there are 
other developing countries (such as Asian countries) with similar natural resources to those of the Andean 
Community willing to attract FDI from developed countries without requiring them to accept the source 
principle as the exclusive tax jurisdiction. This explains why the Andean Community Members were unable 
to conclude any of their tax treaties with developed countries on the basis of the Andean MTC.  
101 On the difference between competition within a standard and between standards, see Section II.A above.  
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model was eventually defeated by the OECD model. The defeat of the Andean model by 
the OECD model is functionally equivalent to the Betamax defeat by VHS in the 
videocassette recorder technology. In both scenarios there was competition between 
incompatible standards; and the prevailing standard implied the virtual elimination of the 
rival one.102 In short, the Andean model failed to solve the prisoner’s dilemma among 
developing countries in international taxation for the two major reasons stated in the 
previous paragraph.  
 
b- The UN Model Tax Convention 
 
The United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention (UN model) is somewhere 
between the (pro-source country) Andean model and the (pro-residence country) OECD 
model. Indeed, the UN model attempts to provide larger, but not exclusive, jurisdiction to 
tax to the source country  than that granted by the OECD model.  
 
The main goal of the UN model is to help developing countries (which are normally source 
countries) in their tax treaty negotiations with developed countries by providing a model 
tax treaty.103 The UN model emerged after both the OECD (1963) and Andean models 
(1969). The UN model was first published in 1980 and eventually updated in 2001.  
 
The UN consists of the OECD model with 27 specific adaptations aimed at enlarging 
source taxation vis a vis residence taxation.104 These adaptations include the following: the 
UN permanent establishment definition is broader than that of the OECD model;105 the UN 
model provides a “limited force of attraction rule” that aims to deter the manipulation of 
permanent establishment attribution rules;106 and the UN definition of royalty is broader 
that that of the OECD model.107 
The evolution of the UN model from its 1980 to 2001 version is towards an increasing 
similarity with the OECD model.108 The dynamics of the converging trend towards the 
OECD model compatible standard is assumed to be similar to that witnessed in United 
States corporate law towards the Delaware compatible standard.109 This evolutionary trend 
 
102 For an explanation on why the Andean Model was defeated by the OECD model using the network market 
theoretical basis, see Section IV.1.b.  
103 Resolution 1273 (XLIII) of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.  
104 Willem F.G. Wijnen, Towards a new UN Model? 1998, International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 
Vol. 52, No. 3 (arguing that the UN model consists of the OECD Model with 27 specific adaptations aimed at 
enlarging source taxation vis a vis residence taxation).   
105 For example, under the OECD model a building site constitutes a PE only if it lasts more than twelve 
months, whereas under the UN Model the required period is only six months. See Art. 5 of the OECD and UN 
MTC.   
106 See UN model, Article 7 (1) 
107 UN model, Article 12 (3) 
108 See, for example, Bart Kosters, The United Nations Model Tax Convention and its Recent Developments, 
Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin, January/February, 4-11 at 7, 2004 (arguing that “The 2001 UN Model made some 
changes to the 1980 version of the UN Model and with regards to the text, the bulk of the changes were made 
with a view to bring the UN Model more in line with the OECD Model”). 
109 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in 
Corporate Law, 105 Harvard Law Review 1435, 1443 (arguing that “Delaware’s dominance of the state 
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is arguably triggered by the lock-in effect of the relevant leading compatible standard110 
(that is, the OECD model in international taxation and the Delaware model in the United 
States corporate law).  
 
In sum, the international tax regime (be it in the OECD, UN or Andean Model versions) has 
been unable so far to solve the prisoner’s dilemma among developing countries for two 
core reasons: a) the lack of an external authority with the authority of conveying a credible 
threat for defecting countries; b) the lack of an iterated prisoner’s dilemma among countries 
able to spontaneously solve the said prisoner’s dilemma. 111 
IV- The Strategic Interaction among Developed and Developing Countries 
 
The motives for which developing countries enter into OECD-type tax treaties with 
developed countries are debatable for two major reasons. First, the OECD model assumes a 
number of elements that are normally absent in asymmetric tax treaties. Those assumptions 
include a  symmetric flow of cross-border income between tax treaty partners,112 and a 
network of domestic courts capable of producing case law with public-good features.113 
Second, there is no empirical evidence about on impact of OECD-based tax treaties on 
Foreign Direct Investment in developing countries.114 These two reasons cause some 
disagreement as to the extent that the OECD model is a cost-effective method for 
 
charter competition has resulted in the widespread diffusion of its law. Other states, anxious to stem the 
exodus of corporations from their jurisdictions, have followed Delaware in adopting various legal rules”).  
110 See Section IV.b. 
111 See Section III.3. 
112 The OECD Model has a residence bias. That is, all things considered, the residence state has a larger tax 
jurisdiction than the source state. Article 21 of the OECD model is a case in point. Article 21 establishes the 
principle according to which items of income not dealt with by the other articles of the OECD Model shall be 
taxable only by the residence state. The residence bias is substantially neutralized in tax treaties among 
developed countries given that capital flows between the contracting states are basically symmetric. 
Conversely, the residence bias is not neutralized in tax treaties concluded between developed and developing 
countries because capital flows are typically asymmetric. Hence, the OECD model usually favours the tax 
jurisdiction of residence states (primarily developed countries) at the expense of source states (mainly 
developing countries).   
113 See Section V.2.b. Case law is a public good (rather than a private good) if it allows a 
representative person to predict the probable outcome of a future court’s decision. See James 
M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan (1974), chapter 6 
(arguing that legal precedent is a form of social capital having public good characteristics). See 
also W. Landes and R. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 
Journal of Law and Economics 249 (1976) (arguing that the body of legal precedents is a capital 
stock that yields a flow of information services).  
114 One of the few analyses of the empirical evidence available on the impact of tax treaties on FDI in 
developing countries is Ronald B. Davies, Tax Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Potential versus 
Performance, International Tax and Public Finance, 11, 775-802 (2004). Davies argues, page 784, that “FDI is 
influenced by factors such as labour markets and location in addition to governmental policies. Thus, the 
available data may be too noisy to tease out the positive effect of tax treaties. Second, it may be that the ways 
treaties are used in practice differ in important ways from the potential uses discussed by theorist”.  He adds 
on page 776 that “many tax treaties contain provisions addressing tax evasion by MNEs, which, if effective, 
could reduce FDI.” 
27
developing countries to attract FDI given the restriction of source taxation that OECD-
based tax treaties imply.  
 
This Section argues that a representative developing country has the incentive to conclude 
OECD-based tax treaties with developed countries for two different (but compatible) 
central reasons. First, there is a prisoner’s dilemma among developing countries in the FDI 
arena that, ceteris paribus, induces developing countries to follow the OECD model for 
fear of driving FDI to competing jurisdictions. Second, the OECD model produces a 
network market of international tax systems that has the standard features of all network 
markets.  
 
1- Why the Asymmetric Tax Treaty Network Emerged  
 
a- The Prisoner’s Dilemma Explanation  
 
Since the end of the World War II, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become an 
important international legal mechanism for the encouragement and governance of foreign 
direct investment. These intergovernmental treaties normally grant extensive rights to 
foreign investors, including protection of contractual rights, the right to international 
arbitration in the event of an investment dispute, and the most-favoured-nation-clause. The 
spread of asymmetric BITs is driven by international competition among potential host 
countries –typically developing countries- for foreign direct investment.115 
The evidence suggests that potential hosts are more likely to sign BITs when their 
competitors have done so.116 The finding is that BITs’ diffusion is associated with 
competitive economic pressures among developing countries to capture a share of foreign 
investment.117 Hence, the emergence of asymmetric BITs is arguably triggered by a 
prisoner’s dilemma among developing countries in the area of foreign direct investments.118 
115 Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman, Beth Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, unpublished paper on file with the author. 
116 Ibidem. 
117 Ibidem. 
118 Andrew Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, Virginia Journal of International Law 38:636-88 (1998). Guzman explains why 
developing countries sign treaties that hurt them, using BITs as a case study. Guzman suggests that 
developing countries´ opportunity to selectively expropriate investors amounts to a tax on investment that 
benefits developing countries because of their collective market power over investment opportunities. 
Accordingly, developing countries sought to strengthen that power when given the opportunity to do so 
collectively within the United Nations. But when they were approached on a bilateral basis and asked by 
developed countries to sign a BIT, they faced a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Each nation could attract more 
investment by committing to not expropriate investors, but the private gain from such a commitment was 
largely a transfer from other developing nations. The growth of BITs thus represents a cascade of defection 
from the collective interest of developing nations. Guzman concludes that although BITs may be globally 
welfare enhancing because they represent a retreat from the exercise of market power by developing nations, 
they may well have lowered the welfare of the developing world. See also Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman 
and Beth Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 
unpublished manuscript on file with the author (arguing that the spread of BITs is driven by international 
competition among potential host countries –typically developing countries – for foreign direct investment. 
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This paper assumes that the same prisoner’s dilemma that explains the emergence of 
asymmetric BITs also explains the emergence of the asymmetric tax treaty network. This 
assumption is grounded on the following rationale. There are a number of differences 
between the tax treaty and BITs networks. However, both types of asymmetric treaty 
networks seek the same fundamental goal: to provide investors with credible property rights 
protection according to norms that are normally consistent with customary international 
law.119 Hence, both asymmetric treaty networks effectively imply an institutional 
outsourcing in the property rights arena.   
 
There are a number of examples that show the interaction between asymmetric BITs and 
the asymmetric tax treaty networks.  The gradual inclusion of standard BIT clauses (such as 
the most–favoured nation) in the asymmetric tax treaty network is a case in point.120 For 
example, the most favoured nation clause is included in several asymmetric tax treaties 
concluded by Argentina with OECD member countries.121 As noted, the interaction 
 
The authors design and test three different measures of economic competition. They also look for indirect 
evidence of competitive pressure on the host to sign BITs. The evidence suggests that potential hosts are more 
likely to sign BITs when their competitors have done so. They find some evidence that coercion plays a role, 
but less support for learning or cultural explanations. Their main finding is that diffusion in this case is 
associated with competitive economic pressures among developing countries to capture a share of foreign 
investment. They are dubious of  the benefits of this competition for development). 
119 See Andrew Guzman, et al, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-
2000, note_ at 3-5 (arguing that BITs are consistent with “customary international law, expressed succinctly 
in the ´Hull Rule,’ [that] held that ´no government is entitled to expropriate private property, for whatever 
purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate, and effective payment therefore”). See also Reuven Avi 
Yonah, International Tax as International Law, 57 Tax Law Review 483, 496-498  (2004) (arguing that “an 
international tax regime does exist and that it rises to the level of customary international law”).      
120 On the MFN clause, see, for example, John H. Jackson, William J. Davey and Alan O. Sykes, Jr., Legal 
Problems of International Economic Relations, Third Edition, West Group, 1995 at 440 (arguing that “the 
concept embodied in the MFN has been traced to the 12th century, although the phrase ´most favored nation´ 
did not appear until the end of the 17th Century).  The concept of MFN originally emerged in international 
trade law. It currently is the cornerstone of the international trade rules embodied in the General Agreement of 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The concept of MNF later expanded to the bilateral investment treaties network, 
and then to the asymmetric tax treaty network.  
121 The most favoured nation (MFN) clause is included in those tax treaties concluded by Argentina with a 
number of OECD countries such as Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, and Switzerland. A representative wording of the MFN is that included in the Argentine-Dutch tax 
treaty. It provides the following: “If under any double tax treaty concluded after the date of conclusion of 
this Convention between the Republic of Argentina and a third country which is a member of the OECD, the 
Republic of Argentina limits its taxation at source on insurance or reinsurance premiums, on dividends as 
meant in subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2 of Article 10, on branch profits, on interest, on royalties, on 
capital gains, on independent personal services, on other income as meant in Article 23, or on specific items 
of such income, to a rate lower, including exemption from taxation, exemption from the additional taxation as 
meant in Article 11, or a taxation over a reduced taxable base, than the rates provided for in paragraph 5 of 
Article 7, subparagraph (a) of paragraph 2 of Article 10, Article 11, paragraph 2 of Article 12, paragraph 2 
of Article 13, paragraphs 2, 5 and 6 of Article 14, subparagraph (b) of paragraph 2 of Article 15 and 
paragraph 3 of Article 23 of this Convention, respectively, then the lower rates, the exemption or the reduced 
taxable base as provided for in the double tax treaty concerned shall automatically apply to the residents of 
both Contracting States, with effect from the date of the entry into force of such double tax treaty, in respect 
to the relevant type or category of income (see Argentine- Netherlands tax treaty - Protocol Clause XIV. 
Additions to Articles 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 23). 
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between both treaty networks is arguably triggered by international competition among 
developing countries for inward investment. 
 
The prisoner’s dilemma theoretical framework provides a strong explanation for developing 
countries´ behaviour in international taxation. It sheds light on the controversy about the 
emergence of the asymmetric tax treaty network that has been addressed by prominent 
academics, such as Charles McLure, Tsilly Dagan, Yariv Brauner, and Diane Ring. Some 
of their views on this controversy will be analysed in light of the prisoner’s dilemma 
framework. 
 
Charles McLure has argued that “[…] although developing countries may prefer to follow 
the UN Model Treaty, which is generally more favourable to source countries, they often 
lack the political clout to prevail in treaty negotiations with developed countries”.122 
Charles McLure´s point seems to be consistent with the prisoner’s dilemma theoretical 
framework. His point could be reconceptualised as follows. Ceteris paribus, the larger the 
relative relevance of a given developing country in the global economy, the closer its tax 
treaty network will be to the UN model. Conversely, the smaller the relative relevance of a 
given developing country in the global economy, the closer its tax treaty network will be to 
the OECD model. Hence, the UN and OECD models are the opposing ends of a continuum. 
The tax treaty network of a given developing country will be closer to the UN or OECD 
model depending on its relative relevance on the global economy.  
 
The Brazilian and Kazakhstan asymmetric tax treaty networks are a case in point. Indeed, 
the Brazilian asymmetric tax treaty network is closer to the UN model than to the OECD 
model,123 whereas the Kazakhstan tax treaty network is closer to the OECD or US models 
than to the UN model.124 This seems to be so because Brazil is relatively more significant 
than Kazakhstan in the global economy.     
 
Tsilly Dagan has argued that developing countries should avoid international double 
taxation through unilateral mechanisms (rather than tax treaties) because the former is more 
cost-effective than the latter for developing countries´ interests.125 Even assuming that her 
point on this topic is correct on normative grounds, from a positive perspective the 
unilateral mechanism is only available to a developing country at a relatively high cost. In 
effect, as stated above, if a given developing country does not consent to sign a bilateral tax 
treaty with a developed country, it is likely ceteris paribus that another developing country 
 
122 Charles E. Mc. Lure, Transfer Pricing and Tax Havens: Mending the LDC Revenue Net, at 5 (unpublished 
manuscript on file with the author).  
123 Likewise, Article 9 of the Argentine tax treaty network (which regulates transfer pricing between 
associated enterprises) is closer to Article 9 of the UN model than that suggested by the OECD model. In 
effect, Article 9 of the tax treaties concluded between Argentina and certain developed countries (such as 
Denmark, Canada, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden) includes paragraph three of Article 9 of the 
UN Model.      
124 An example of this strategic scenario is the Kazakhstan-USA tax treaty in which Kazakhstan accepted to 
follow the US model as is. (I am grateful to Reuven Avi Yonah for providing me this example). 
125 See Dagan, supra note _, at 995-996. 
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will. This pattern of behaviour is the result of the above mentioned prisoner’s dilemma 
involving developing countries, and the network externalities derived from the tax treaty 
network.126 Within that strategic framework, entering into a tax treaty seems to be the best 
available option for a representative developing country to attract FDI into its jurisdiction if 
all other conditions are equal.127 In sum, Tsylly Dagan´s point arguably overlooks 
international tax competition among developing countries.  
 
Yariv Brauner has maintained that “...there is a definite proof that developing countries 
have benefited from the current bilateral tax treaty practice. They have never been forced, 
nor claimed to have been forced, into concluding a bilateral tax treaty with a developed 
country. In fact, in most cases the developing countries wish to conclude treaties with the 
developed countries, which reject their wishes in times...”. 128 
Brauner’s point also arguably overlooks international tax competition among developing 
countries. The fact that developing countries normally conclude OECD-based tax treaties 
may be the result of the prisoner’s dilemma referred to above. Indeed, developing countries 
have no better option (from an individual rather than aggregate perspective) for attracting 
FDI given the prisoner’s dilemma and network market in which they are involved. 
Moreover, developed countries like the United States have sometimes rejected the 
conclusion of tax treaties with certain developing countries because those developing 
countries may not be willing to introduce provisions (such as limitation of benefit clauses) 
that ban tax treaty shopping schemes. This pattern of behaviour does not necessarily deter 
United States investment into, say, Latin American countries. For example, there is no tax 
treaty between Brazil and the United States of America. However, a US Multinational 
enterprise may invest in Brazil via its subsidiary based in, say, the Netherlands within the 
framework of the Brazil-Netherlands tax treaty (the United States-Netherlands-Brazil 
example).  
 
Finally, Diane Ring has argued that “… the double taxation regime process most closely 
mirrors a coordination game. As such, we would expect that agreement would be relatively 
easier to achieve because there is no monitoring problem (no need to prevent defection). 
The primary challenge in a coordination game is the need to reach a decision that may have 
some distributive effect. The greater the distributional component of the coordination game, 
the more difficult it is to reach a consensus. Thus, where negotiating countries A and B are 
both developed countries with similar investment flows, fewer distributional issues should 
arise. If A is a developed country and B a developing country, the selection of regime rules 
will carry distributional consequences that will impede agreement”.129 
126 See Part IV.b below. 
127 Davies, supra note _ at 775-802, 2004. Davies argues, on the basis of empirical evidence, that tax treaties 
seem to be a necessary, but not sufficient, for attracting FDI to developing countries.   
128 See Brauner, supra note _, at 45. 
129 Diane Ring, International Tax Relations: Theory and Implications, at 65, final electronic version 
forthcoming in Tax Law Review (Fall 2006/Winter 2007). 
31
Ring´s point, according to which the double taxation regime process most closely mirrors a 
coordination game, is debatable when applied to the asymmetric tax treaty network. As the 
China vs. India example suggests, the strategic interaction among developing countries in 
international taxation is a prisoner’s dilemma (rather than a coordination game).130 This 
prisoner’s dilemma influences the interaction between developed and developing countries 
when concluding asymmetric tax treaties. Indeed, there are competition (rather than 
coordination) elements that induce developing countries to include clauses in their 
asymmetric tax treaties such as the most favoured nation.131 The presence of these sorts of 
competition elements in the asymmetric tax treaty network suggests that the interaction 
among developed and developing countries in international taxation is something different 
from a coordination game.  
 
In sum, two major conclusions can be reached on Brauner, Dagan, and Ring´s 
aforementioned points. First, those points seem to overlook the international tax 
competition in which developing countries are involved in international taxation.132 Second, 
Brauner´s and Dagan´s points are grounded in a debatable assumption. They both assume 
that developing countries´ strategic interaction is static (rather than dynamic). Indeed, 
Brauner´s point assumes that it is always good for a representative developing country’s 
interest to join the tax treaty network. Conversely, Dagan´s point assumes that that 
behaviour is always bad for the interest of a representative developing country. 133 
b- The Network Market Explanation  
 
This section elaborates a second reason (compatible with that based on the prisoner’s 
dilemma referred to above) for explaining why a representative developing country is 
willing to conclude OECD-based tax treaties. According to this second reason, the OECD 
model creates a network market of international tax systems that induces developing 
countries to join the tax treaty network.  
 
As noted earlier, this section is grounded on the following assumption. Countries are 
involved in international tax competition within a compatible standard (rather than between 
incompatible standards) in which the compatible standard is the OECD model. 
Interestingly, the current international tax competition within a compatible standard seems 
to be functionally equivalent to that witnessed in the CD Market. Taxpayers (like users in 
the CD market) can interact at a lower transaction cost than would be the case if the 
competition were among incompatible standards. Examples of incompatible standards in 
the videocassette recorder industry are VHS-Betamax, whereas those of international 
taxation are the OECD - Andean models.134 
130 See Section III.1. 
131 See Section IV.1.a. 
132 Ibidem. 
133 See Section IV.1.3 (arguing that the strategic interaction of developing countries in this area is dynamic 
(rather than static)). 
134 See Section III.3.2. 
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This assumption entails two central implications. On the one hand, the OECD-based tax 
treaty network is a network market of competing, decentralized international tax systems. 
On the other hand, the OECD-based tax treaty network has the standard features of all 
network markets: externalities, expectations, and lock-in effects.  These three features are 
explored independently as follows.   
 
b.1 Network Externalities of the Tax Treaty Network 
Network externalities exist when the benefits from a good or service depend on the number 
of users of the same good or service. This happens, for example, with telecommunications. 
In effect, the value of having a telephone for an individual user depends on the number of 
other consumers using compatible telephones.135 Likewise, the benefits for a country 
joining the OECD-based tax treaty network depend on the number of countries that are 
members of that network. Indeed, the tax treaty network produces positive network 
externalities only for those countries (including developing countries) that participate in the 
tax treaty network. Following are five examples of positive network externalities of the tax 
treaty network.  
 
First, a major set of costs associated with the operation of legal institutions consist is that of 
disseminating information about the content of the law among members of society 
including foreign investors (communication cost).136 The fact that most tax treaties are 
based on the same model and are normally written in the same language (i.e. English) is 
instrumental in minimising the communication cost of the tax treaty network.137 Moreover, 
the larger the number of countries involved in the tax treaty network, the lower the average 
communication cost of the tax treaty network.     
 
Second, another major set of costs associated with the operation of legal institutions are 
those costs incurred in the course of applying the law to a particular dispute (enforcement 
cost).138 The larger the number of countries involved in the tax treaty network, the lower 
the average enforcement cost of a given developing country tax treaty network. For 
example, the OECD network market provides developing countries´ domestic courts the 
option of minimising enforcement cost by referring to legal sources that are unavailable to 
those countries that are outside the tax treaty network. These legal resources include case 
law produced by foreign domestic courts interpreting OECD-based tax treaties. For 
example, the Supreme Court of Singapore has the option of using the Supreme Court of 
 
135 Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, The American Economic Review, Vol. 75, N° 3, 
424-440 (June, 1985). 
136 Kevin Davies, Lawmaking in Small Jurisdictions, New York University School of Law at 5 (September 
2004) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).  
137 OECD-based asymmetric tax treaties concluded between non-English speaking countries are frequently in 
English. This is probably in order to  minimize communication costs. See, for example, the Argentina-
Netherlands tax treaty concluded in 1998.   
138 Ibidem. 
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India decision in re Union of India in cases related to tax treaty shopping.139 Needless to 
say, this option for minimizing the enforcement cost is unavailable to courts belonging to 
countries that are not members of the tax treaty network.140 
Third, the OECD-based tax treaty network offers countries a number of procedures for 
solving transfer pricing disputes that are normally unavailable to countries that do not 
participate in the tax treaty network. A prominent example of this sort of procedure is the 
multilateral advance pricing agreement (APA) that is regulated by Article 25 (Paragraph 3) 
of the OECD Model.141 An APA is an arrangement that determines, in advance of 
controlled transactions, an appropriate set of criteria (e.g. method, comparables and 
appropriate adjustments thereto, and critical assumptions as to future events) for the 
determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions over a fixed period of time.142
 
For example, in the early nineties a multilateral APA was successfully issued to solve a 
transfer pricing problem relating to the global trading of derivatives and commodities.
 
In 
the context of a multilateral APA among tax treaty partners, the US, the UK, and Japan 
agreed to develop a profit-split formula for the allocation of income derived from the global 
trading of derivatives and commodities (APA on Global Trading).143
 
The contracting states 
considered that the agreed-upon profit-split formula was consistent with the ALS as 
codified in Article 9.1 of the relevant tax treaties.144
 
Needless to say, the APA on Global 
Trading would have been more costly to reach in a world without tax treaties. Interestingly, 
 
139 See Section III.1 
140 This paper assumes that developed countries normally prefer the OECD model to other options because 
that is the prevailing preference of their taxpayers for minimising both information and enforcement costs. 
When a representative MNE has to choose between two developing countries that offer similar advantages 
where one has a tax treaty with his home jurisdiction and the other does not, it normally prefers the former to 
the latter.  There are a number of reasons that may explain this preference. For example, domestic courts´ 
have a broader scope for construing arbitrarily domestic norms than tax treaty norms. This is so because 
courts´ improper behaviour might be more visible to an international audience in the latter case than in the 
former.  
141 See OECD guidelines. See, for example, Eduardo Baistrocchi, The Transfer Pricing Problem: A Global 
Proposal for Simplification, note _ (providing examples of multilateral APAs).  
142 See OECD guidelines, 4.124. By the same token, an APA has been defined by the U.S. as an agreement 
between the tax authority and the taxpayer on the transfer pricing method. The APA can be applied to any 
apportionment or allocation of income, deductions, credits, or allowances between two or more organizations, 
trades, or businesses owned or controlled (directly or indirectly) by the same interests. See section 1 of the 
U.S. Rev. Proc. 96-53, IRB CB 96-49 (December 2, 1996). Similar definitions of APAs have been established 
in some other countries, such as Australia (section 10 of the ATO Taxation Ruling 95/23, on APAs) and 
Canada (sections 3 and 4 Revenue Canada Information Circular Number 94-4)). See Jose Manuel Calderon, 
Advance Pricing Agreements. A Global Analysis, Kluwer Law International (1998).  
143Libin, Jerome B., Formulary Apportionment for Global Trading in the Manufacturing Industry: Can It 
Work? Tax Notes Int’l, p. 1375 (Nov. 20, 1995). 
144 This position is consistent with the current OECD view according to which, under some cir-
cumstances, a multifactor formula reflects the ALS. See OECD, Discussion Draft of the Attribution to 
Permanent Establishments (PES: Part III (Enterprises Carrying on Global Trading of Financial Instruments), 
paragraphs 157-160 (March 4, 2003), available at www.oecd.org. That report provides, inter alia, “guidance 
on how to apply the profit split method in accordance with the arm’s length principle, with particular 
reference to the multi-factor formula approach.” (See paragraph 160.) 
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developing countries who are members of the tax treaty network (such as China) have 
already concluded multilateral APAs.145 
Fourth, the secondary adjustment system (SAS) is a bilateral or multilateral procedure that 
is normally unavailable to countries that do not participate in the OECD-based tax treaty 
network. SAS seeks to minimize international double taxation problems emerging in those 
cases of transfer pricing adjustment implemented unilaterally (rather than bilaterally) by a 
competent authority.146 
Fifth, belonging to the tax treaty network gives its members a reputation of being 
committed to keeping their local international tax system consistent with customary 
international law (i.e., the international tax regime) for a substantial period of time. Indeed, 
the process of termination of a tax treaty is more time consuming than that required for the 
abrogation of domestic tax legislation which, in some jurisdictions, can be implemented 
overnight.147 Hence, for a developing country to belong to the tax treaty network normally 
amounts to a credible commitment to predictability and stability according to well-known 
legal norms; that is, those norms based upon the OECD model or compatible models (such 
as the UN Model) and their related body of precedent. This argument is functionally 
equivalent to the race for predictability and stability theory that has been elaborated to 
understand the dynamics of competition among the states in United States of America in 
the area of corporate law.148 
In short, the OECD-based tax treaty network produces positive network externalities for its 
members that are unavailable to non-members. They are the following: i) minimization of 
communication and enforcement costs; ii) provision of a number of procedures for 
minimising international double taxation, such as the APA and the secondary adjustment 
procedure; and iii) credible commitment to predictability and legal stability.  
 
b.2- Expectations for the Tax Treaty Network  
 
A second standard feature of all network markets is expectations. As already noted, the 
initial success of the MS-DOS operative system is not normally explained by its technical 
 
145 See Paul Previtera, First China-Japan APA: A Coup for Both Countries, Tax Notes International, August 
22, 2005, p. 686.  
146 The SAP procedure is regulated by Article 9 of the OECD model as follows: “Where a Contracting State 
includes in the profits of an enterprise of that State –and taxes accordingly- profits on which en enterprise of 
the other Contracting State has been charged to tax in that other State and the profits so included are profits 
which would have accrued to the enterprise of the first-mentioned State if the conditions made between the 
two enterprises had been those which would have been made between independent enterprises, then that other 
State shall make an appropriate adjustment to the amount of the tax charged therein on those profits. In 
determining such adjustment, due regard shall be had to the other provisions of this Convention and the 
competent authorities of the Contracting States shall if necessary consult each other”.    
147 Tsylly Dagan, The Tax Treaty Myth, supra note _ 
148 See, for example, Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: the Desirable Limits on State 
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harvard Law Review 1435, 1446-1447  (1991-1992) (arguing that the 
success of Delaware’s corporate law over competing regulations is due to its ability to offer a credible 
commitment to predictability and stability).  
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superiority, but rather due to the fact that it was backed by IBM.149 Likewise, the 
acceptance of the OECD Model over other available standards by developing countries can 
be explained by the fact that the OECD model is sponsored by the world’s most developed 
countries that are, not coincidentally, the major capital exporting countries. In sum, the 
expectation that the OECD model would prevail over other available standards (such as the 
Andean model) is a key element that explains the success of the OECD Model as the core 
structure of the international tax regime.    
 
b.3- Lock-in Effect of the Tax Treaty Network  
 
Finally, another key element of all network markets is its lock-in effect. For example, a 
better standard that arrives later may be unable to prevail over another, inferior model that 
arrived earlier. An instance of this problem is the QWERTY system.150 Likewise, the lock-
in effect may explain that the fundamental structure of the OECD model is identical to that 
designed by the League of Nations Report in 1923 despite the substantial changes that have 
occurred in the world economy since then.151 
The consequences of the lock-in effect of the OECD model can be witnessed in two 
different dimensions. First, it induces other different but compatible standards to be based 
on the OECD model and to gradually converge towards the OECD Model (such as the UN 
model).152 Second, the lock-in effect of the OECD model is capable of destroying 
incompatible standards (such as the Andean Model).153 Both dimensions of the lock-in 
effect of the OECD model are outlined as follows. 
 
The UN model is based on the OECD model because, inter alia, the OECD model emerged 
earlier. The United Nations Ad Hoc Group of Experts implicitly acknowledged the lock-in 
effect of the OECD Model:  
 
“(The) Group of Experts . . . decided to used the OECD Model 
Convention as its main reference text in order to take advantage of the 
accumulated technical expertise embodied in that Convention and the 
Commentary thereon, and also for reasons of practical convenience 
stemming from the fact that the Convention was being used by OECD 
member countries in the negotiation of tax treaties not only with each 
other but also with developing countries.”154 
Moreover, the lock-in effect of the OECD model has arguably influenced the evolution of 
the UN model over time. This explains, for example, why the UN model is increasingly 
similar to the OECD model. As noted earlier, the 2001 version of the UN model is closer 
than its 1980 version to the OECD model. 155 
149 See Section II.1.a. 
150 See Section II.1.b.  
151 See Section I. 
152 See Section II.1.b 
153 See Section III.3.a. 
154 See United Nations, Introduction to Model Treaty.  
155 See Section III.3.b.  
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The dynamics of the lock-in effect of the OECD model can also be seen when an 
incompatible standard emerges. Indeed, those international tax systems that are 
incompatible with the OECD-based international tax regime are normally destroyed 
because of that incompatibility. The Andean Model, referred to above, is a case in point. In 
effect, the Andean model was eventually defeated by the OECD model because of their 
incompatibility.156 
In sum, both the line of reasoning grounded on the prisoner’s dilemma and the one on the 
network market rationale arguably explain the behaviour of developing countries in 
concluding OECD-based tax treaties with developed countries. Neither of these arguments 
sheds light on whether this behaviour is consistent with developing countries aggregate 
(rather than individual) interests. This is an empirical and dynamic issue. It is an empirical 
issue because it requires measuring the cost (e.g. reduction of source taxation triggered by 
the prisoner’s dilemma) and benefits (e.g. positive network externalities) faced by 
developing countries when joining the tax treaty network. This empirical issue is also 
dynamic. The cost/benefit implications of the asymmetric tax treaty network to developing 
countries may change over time. It may be cost effective at one time and cost ineffective at 
another. 157 
V- Tax Treaty Interpretation in Emerging Economies  
 
This Section extends the theory on the emergence of the asymmetric treaty network, 
elaborated in the previous sections, to the area of tax treaty interpretation in the developing 
world. Three major points are argued.  
 
First, that tax treaty interpretation is a debatable issue mainly because central provisions of 
the OECD model are predominantly standards-based (rather than rules-based). Hence, the 
precise meaning of those provisions is not certain ex-ante. Their precise meaning can only 
be determined ex-post through case law (or something functionally equivalent to case law).  
 
Second, identifying the structure of incentives that courts normally face when solving tax- 
treaty cases is a relevant element for predicting court decisions given the standard-based 
nature of the OECD model.  
 
156 See Section III.3.a. 
157 This Article assumes that the decision of a representative developing country to join the tax treaty network 
is a condition necessary (but not sufficient) for attracting inward FDI. First, this condition is necessary 
because of the prisoner’s dilemma and network externalities arguments elaborated above. (A caveat is 
required here. As the United States-Netherlands-Brazil example suggests, joining the tax treaty network does 
not mean for a developing country concluding tax treaties with all available developed countries (including 
the United States). It means something less demanding than that. It means concluding tax treaties with some 
developed jurisdictions with an extensive tax treaty network (such as the Netherlands), which may operate as 
a conduit for channelling investments between developed and developing countries.) Second, as the Argentine 
case suggests, joining the tax treaty network is a condition not sufficient for attracting inward FDI. For 
example, inward investment to Argentina shrank dramatically after its 2001 crisis despite the fact there was 
no substantial change to the Argentine tax treaty network, which had arguably facilitated massive investments 
during the 1990´s.   
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Third, this Section assumes that, ceteris paribus, courts of a representative developing 
country have an incentive to construe the OECD-based tax treaties in favour of the 
taxpayer, instead of the tax authority, for fear of driving FDI to competing jurisdictions. 
Hence, the prisoner’s dilemma and network market arguments referred to above have an 
impact on tax treaty interpretation in the developing world. The Union of India case is used 
as a case study for grounding this assumption.   
 
1- Standards versus Rules: An Economic Analysis158 
Identifying the structure of incentives that courts normally face when solving tax treaty 
cases is a relevant element for predicting court decisions given the standard-based nature of 
the OECD model. This section aims to demonstrate the said standard (rather than rule) 
based nature of the OECD model.   
 
Legal systems must provide information about the legal norms applicable in a given 
society. Interestingly, the government can give content to legal norms ex ante (via rules) or 
ex post (via standards). Examples of rules and standards can be found in many settings. For 
instance, a norm demanding “no driving in excess of 55 miles per hour” is a rule because its 
meaning is precise before an individual drives her vehicle. Conversely, the norm “drive 
carefully” is a standard because its meaning can be determined ex post via case law only (or 
by something functionally equivalent to case law).   
 
Rules and standards differ in at least three important dimensions: (i) cost structure; (ii) 
distribution of power within a legal system; and (iii) institutional assumptions. Those three 
dimensions will be addressed independently.159 
First, rules and standards have different costs of promulgation (i.e. the expenses incurred in 
the creation of a norm) and enforcement (i.e. the cost arising from applying a norm to a 
given set of facts). On the one hand, rules are normally associated with high promulgation 
costs and low enforcement costs. An example of a rule is a precise tax norm that clearly 
specifies ex ante the taxpayer’s expected behaviour. Hence, rules are expensive to create, 
but relatively cheap to apply given their largely self-enforcing character. 160 On the other 
hand, standards are normally associated with low promulgation costs and high enforcement 
costs. An instance of a standard is the arm’s length approach. Its precise meaning can only 
be provided ex post via case law. 161 Therefore, the enforcement cost of standards is high 
vis-à-vis its promulgation cost. 
 
158 This section is closely based on the following Articles: Kaplow Louis, Rules versus Standards: An 
Economic Analysis, 22 Duke Law Journal 557 (1992); Kaplow, Louis, The Value of Accuracy in 
Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 Journal of Legal Studies 307 (1994). 
159 Ibidem.
160 Reinier Krakman & Bernard Black, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harvard Law Review 
1911 (1996) (arguing that violation of rules is more visible to public opinion than violation of standards. 
Hence, rules, unlike standards, normally are self-enforcing).  
161 Eduardo Baistrocchi, The Arm’s Length Standard in the 21st Century: A Proposal for both Developed and 
Developing Countries, Tax Notes International, October 18, 2004.  
38
Second, rules and standards imply differing institutional allocations of power. While rules 
are usually a centralised creation of the legislative branch of government, standards are a 
decentralised creation of the law through, paradigmatically, the judiciary.  
 
Finally, standards and rules have different institutional assumptions. Standards (unlike 
rules) presuppose a legal system capable of producing case law with public good features. 
Standards therefore require a higher threshold of human capital endowments than rules 
within the legal system in which they operate (such as competent lawyers and judges). 
 
2- The OECD Model: A Standard-Based Regime  
 
This Section identifies the structure of the OECD model using the rule/standard distinction 
as a theoretical framework. It argues that the central norms of the OECD model are 
fundamentally standards-based (rather than rules-based). That is, the full meaning of the 
central norms of the OECD model can be provided ex post by case law only (or by 
something functionally equivalent to case law). Articles 9.1 and 3.2 are used as examples 
for grounding this proposition. 
 
a- The Cases of Articles 3.2 and 9.1: Standard-based Norms 
 
The OECD model regulates the transfer pricing problem through two separate provisions. 
Article 7 addresses that problem in the context of permanent establishments, whereas 
Article 9.1 focuses on the transfer pricing problem in the context of associated enterprises. 
Article 9.1 states the following: 
 
“Associated Enterprises  
1. Where  
a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or indirectly in the 
management, control or capital of an enterprise of the other Contracting State, or b) the 
same persons participate directly or indirectly in the management, control or capital of an enterprise 
of a Contracting State and an enterprise of the other Contracting State, and in either case conditions 
are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which 
differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any profits which 
would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those 
conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed ac-
cordingly.”  
 
Article 9.1 embodies a norm that has the following logical structure: 
 
1) If associated enterprises conclude a transfer price; 
2) And that transfer price is not consistent with the arm’s length standard (ALS); then 
3) The tax authority may adjust that transfer price to make it consistent with the ALS. 
 
Interestingly, the OECD model does not provide an ex ante meaning for two 
fundamental elements of Article 9.1: neither “associated enterprise” nor “ALS” is 
defined by the OECD model.  Article 3.2 governs those situations where terms are not 
defined in the OECD model in order to solve the interpretative problem of norms 
without ex ante meaning. Article 3.2 states the following: 
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“As regards the application of the Convention at any time by a Contracting 
State, any term not defined there in shall, unless the context otherwise 
requires, have the meaning that it has at that time under the law of that State 
for the purposes of the taxes to which the Convention applies, any meaning 
under the applicable tax laws of that State prevailing over a meaning given to 
the term under other laws of that State.” 
 
The logical structure of Article 3.2 is the following: 
 
1) If a term is not defined in the OECD model; 
2) And the context does not otherwise require; then 
3) The meaning of that term will be provided by domestic law of Contracting States. 
 
Article 3.2 of the OECD model has a mixed character. It consists of a rule embedded in a 
standard. In effect, the rule (“undefined terms must be defined by contracting states’ 
domestic law”) is subject to the standard (“unless the context otherwise requires”). Article 
3.2 has, therefore, a prevailing standard-based nature because only case law can provide a 
meaning for the standard “unless the context otherwise requires.” In sum, both Article 9.1 
and Article 3.2 have a standards-based (rather than a rules-based) structure because they 
lack a precise ex ante meaning.  
 
b- Main Assumption of the OECD Model: a Decentralised Network of Domestic Courts 
Capable of Producing Case Law with Public Good Features  
 
The previous Section has shown that two central norms of the OECD model (i.e.,  Articles 
3.2 and 9.1) have standard-based features. Other prominent examples of OECD norms that 
are of a standard-based nature include the following, for reasons similar to those identified 
when analysing Articles 3.2 and 9.1: agent of independent status (Article 5.6), beneficial 
owner (Articles 10, 11 and 12), and royalties (Article 12).162 
The standard-based structure of the OECD model is significant as it shows that the OECD 
model is grounded on a crucial institutional assumption. The OECD model assumes that the 
content of its norms will be fundamentally provided by a network of decentralised domestic 
courts via case law of a public good nature.163 The standard-based nature of the OECD 
model explains why tax treaty interpretation is not like mathematics. Courts normally have 
room in construing tax treaties that they can take into account strategic considerations as 
the Union of India case shows.164 
162 The standard-based structure of the OECD model is shared by the UN model given the decreasing 
differences between these two models (see Section III.3.b ) 
163 Case law is a public good (rather than a private good) if it allows a representative person to predict the 
probable outcome of a future court’s decision. See James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty: Between 
Anarchy and Leviathan (1974), chapter 6 (arguing that legal precedent is a form of social capital having 
public good characteristics). See also W. Landes and R. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis, 19 Journal of Law and Economics 249 (1976) (arguing that the body of legal precedents is a capital 
stock that yields a flow of information services). 
164 Eduardo Baistrocchi, The Transfer Pricing Problem: A Global Proposal for Simplification, The Tax 
Lawyer, summer 2006, forthcoming. 
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3- The Union of India Case: a Possible Alternative Decision 
 
a- Incentives Matter in Tax Treaty Interpretation in Emerging Countries 
 
The Union of India is a paradigmatic case of tax treaty shopping.165 The taxpayer had 
designed a triangular tax planning scheme for channelling FDI from the relevant OECD 
countries into India via the Mauritius-India tax treaty (rather than channelling them from an 
OECD country to India). According to the Supreme Court of India, the taxpayer’s main 
goal in this case was to achieve an international double non-taxation result.  The Supreme 
Court of India decided the case in favour of the taxpayer.  
 
As seen, the Supreme Court of India construed one tax treaty (the Indo-Mauritius tax 
treaty) in light of another tax treaty (the Indo-US tax treaty).166 This inter-textual method 
of interpretation seems compelling. However, there are other equally compelling legal 
arguments that could have led to an opposing result, that is, in favour of the tax authority 
(instead of the taxpayer). One argument that may have led to a result in favour of the tax 
authority is the following. 
 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties (VCLT) sets forth the 
general rule of treaty interpretation. It prohibits the use of unilateral documents for 
construing treaties.167 The commentary to Article 31 rejects the interpretative value of 
unilateral documents as follows: “The principle on which this provision is based is that a 
unilateral document cannot be regarded as forming part of the ´context´ within the 
meaning of Article 31 […]”. Hence, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention forbids 
construing a treaty signed between A and B (first treaty) in light of a treaty concluded 
between A with C (second treaty). This is because the second treaty should be considered 
as a unilateral document in relation to the first treaty, given that C did not take part in the 
treaty concluded between A and B. In sum, the second treaty should be irrelevant for 
construing the first treaty according to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.    
 
The reasoning outlined in the previous paragraph is arguably crucial to the Union of India 
case. There is no evidence in the Union of India decision that Mauritius had accepted in 
 
165 See Section III.1. 
166 Ibidem. 
167 Article 31 of the VCLT provides the following. “General rule of interpretation 1. A treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose.  2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a 
treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:  
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 3. There shall 
be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding 
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 4. A special meaning shall 
be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.” (Emphasis added). 
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any way the Indo-US tax treaty.168 Thus, the Indo-US tax treaty should be treated as a 
unilateral document in relation to the Indo-Mauritius tax treaty, and, as such, should be 
immaterial for construing the Indo-Mauritius tax treaty.  
 
In sum, incentive matters in tax treaty interpretation given the standard (rather than rule) 
based structure of tax treaties based on the OECD model. The incentive structure for 
developing countries referred to above169 seems to be an instrumental element in predicting 
their decisions in tax treaty cases because courts normally have enough room to choose 
between competing (sometimes opposing) constructions equally consistent with the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties and Article 3.2 of the OECD model. The Union of India 
case suggests that developing countries´ courts – consistent with the individual interest of 
their own countries - are influenced by the prisoner’s dilemma and network externalities 
previously mentioned.170 Hence, this paper assumes that developing countries’ courts have 
the incentive to construe the local tax treaty network in the foreign direct investment arena 
in favour of the taxpayer (rather than the tax authority) for fear of driving this investment to 
competing jurisdictions if all other conditions are equal.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
This Article offers an answer to two fundamental questions on the emergence and evolution 
of the asymmetric tax treaty network that represents, for example, over 50% of the United 
States and United Kingdom tax treaty networks.  First, it elaborates a theory for explaining 
why a representative developing country is willing to conclude tax treaties with developed 
countries on the basis of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
(OECD model). Second, this Article extends that theory to tax treaty interpretation in the 
developing world. This extension aims to illuminate the structure of incentives the courts of 
a representative developing country normally have when construing OECD-based tax 
treaties in the foreign direct investment (FDI) area. Game theory is used as a theoretical 
framework for answering both questions. 
 
This Article‘s analysis is premised on the following three major assumptions. First, 
developing countries are habitually engaged in international tax competition within a 
compatible standard (rather than between incompatible standards). The current compatible 
standard is the OECD model, which channels international tax competition into areas that 
are not regulated by the OECD Model, such as the inclusion of clauses like most–favoured- 
nation in asymmetric tax treaties.171 Second, the OECD-based tax treaty network is a 
network market of decentralized international tax regimes that has the standard features of 
all network markets: externalities, expectations, and lock-in effects. 172 Third, it is also 
assumed that the OECD model compatible standard is capable of destroying incompatible 
 
168 The Indo-Mauritius tax treaty became effective six years before the Indo-US tax treaty. In effect, while the 
former become effective as of 1983, the latter did so in 1989.    
169 See Sections III and IV. 
170 See Section III. 
171 See Section IV.1.a (offering examples of asymmetric tax treaties that include most favoured nation clauses 
(MFN). The OECD model does not even refer to the MFN clause).  
172 See Section IV.1.b (providing examples of externalities, expectations and lock-in effects of the OECD- 
based tax treaty network).  
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standards (such as the Andean Model)173 and inducing other, different, but compatible 
standards (like the United Nations model) to gradually converge towards the OECD Model. 
 
The Article argues that a representative developing country has the incentive to conclude 
tax treaties with developed countries for two different, but compatible, central reasons. 
First, there is a prisoner’s dilemma among developing countries in the arena of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) that induces developing countries to follow the OECD model for 
fear of driving FDI to competing jurisdictions if all other conditions are equal.174 Second, 
the OECD model produces a network market of international tax systems that has the 
standard features of all network markets. For example, the OECD-based network market of 
international tax systems conveys positive network externalities only to those countries 
(including developing countries) that are members of this network.175 
Both the point grounded on the prisoner’s dilemma and the one on the network market 
rationale arguably explain the behaviour of developing countries in concluding OECD-
based tax treaties with developed countries. Neither of these points sheds light on whether 
this behaviour is consistent with developing countries aggregate (rather than individual) 
interests. This is an empirical and dynamic issue.176 It is an empirical issue because it 
requires measuring the cost (e.g. reduction of source taxation triggered by the prisoner’s 
dilemma) and benefits (e.g. positive network externalities) faced by developing countries 
when joining the tax treaty network. This empirical issue is also dynamic. The cost/benefit 
implications of the asymmetric tax treaty network to developing countries may change over 
time. It may be cost effective at one time and cost ineffective at another time.177 
Finally, this Article extends the theory on the emergence of the asymmetric tax treaty 
network to the area of tax treaty interpretation by developing countries´ courts. It assumes 
that developing countries´ courts – consistent with the individual interest of their own 
countries - are influenced by the prisoner’s dilemma and network externalities referred to 
above. Hence, developing countries courts have the incentive to construe the local tax 
treaty network in the foreign direct investment arena in favour of the taxpayer (rather than 
the tax authority) for fear of driving investment to competing jurisdictions if all other 
conditions are equal.  This strategic construction of the asymmetric tax treaty network is 
facilitated by the standard (rather than rule) character of the OECD model. The Union of 
India case recently decided by the Indian Supreme Court is used as a case study.178 
In sum, the emergence of the asymmetric tax treaty network since the early 1960´s is not a 
miracle but rather an intelligible, but sometimes failed, attempt to solve problems arising 
from the strategic interactions among nations for the division of the international tax 
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base.179 It remains to be seen if the emergence of the OECD Model itself (and its 
predecessors) is a miracle. 
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